LEADER 04174nam 2200577Ia 450 001 9910789907403321 005 20230725033434.0 010 $a0-87609-517-1 035 $a(CKB)2670000000185594 035 $a(EBL)3137484 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000658521 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11414877 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000658521 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10691030 035 $a(PQKB)11463539 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3137484 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3137484 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10554829 035 $a(OCoLC)922997904 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000185594 100 $a20120106d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aSaudi Arabia in the New Middle East$b[electronic resource] /$fF. Gregory Gause III 210 $aNew York $cCouncil on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action$dc2011 215 $a1 online resource (64 p.) 225 1 $aCouncil special report ;$vno. 63 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-87609-516-3 327 $a""Contents""; ""Foreword""; ""Acknowledgments""; ""Map""; ""Introduction""; ""Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia""; ""Saudi Regional Policy in the Wake of the Arab Upheaval""; ""Saudi-U.S. Relations""; ""Conclusion""; ""Endnotes""; ""About the Author""; ""Advisory Committee""; ""CPA Advisory Committee""; ""Mission Statement of the Center for Preventive Action""; ""Council Special Reports"" 330 $aThe United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia has been one of the cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Middle East for decades. Despite their substantial differences in history, culture, and governance, the two countries have generally agreed on important political and economic issues and have often relied on each other to secure mutual aims. Their ongoing cooperation on maintaining regional stability, moderating the global oil market, and pursuing terrorists should not be downplayed. Yet for all the relationship's importance, it is increasingly imperiled by mistrust and misunderstanding. One major question is Saudi Arabia's stability. In this report, the author explores the foundations of Riyadh's present stability and potential sources of future unrest. It is difficult not to notice that Saudi Arabia avoided significant upheaval during the political uprisings that swept the Middle East in 2011, despite sharing many of the social and economic problems of Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. But unlike their counterparts in Cairo, Sanaa, and Tripoli, Riyadh's leadership was able to maintain order in large part by increasing public spending on housing and salaries, relying on loyal and well-equipped security forces, and utilizing its extensive patronage networks. The divisions within the political opposition also helped the government's cause. This is not to say that the stability of the House of Saud is assured. The author points out that the top heirs to the throne are elderly and the potential for disorderly squabbling may increase as a new generation enters the line of succession. Moreover, the population is growing quickly, and there is little reason to believe that oil will forever be able to buy social tranquility. Perhaps most important, the author argues, the leadership's response to the 2011 uprisings did little to forestall future crises; an opportunity for manageable political reform was mostly lost. 410 0$aCSR (New York, N.Y.) ;$vno. 63. 606 $aInternational relations$xHistory$y21st century 607 $aSaudi Arabia$xPolitics and government$y21st century 607 $aSaudi Arabia$xForeign relations$zUnited States 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zSaudi Arabia 615 0$aInternational relations$xHistory 676 $a320.9538 700 $aGause$b F. Gregory$01497272 712 02$aCouncil on Foreign Relations. 712 02$aCenter for Preventive Action. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910789907403321 996 $aSaudi Arabia in the New Middle East$93722325 997 $aUNINA