LEADER 07143oam 22014534 450 001 9910789904003321 005 20230801223133.0 010 $a1-4639-8626-2 010 $a1-4639-4952-9 010 $a1-4639-4099-8 035 $a(CKB)2670000000184980 035 $a(EBL)1606540 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000941791 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11498812 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941791 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10964434 035 $a(PQKB)11233022 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606540 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1606540 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10553701 035 $a(OCoLC)870244936 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2012029 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2012029 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000184980 100 $a20020129d2012 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBank Funding Structures and Risk : $eEvidence From the Global Financial Crisis /$fPablo Federico, Francisco Vazquez 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (35 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4639-3314-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Abstract; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Empirical Hypotheses; III. Data and Target Variables; A. Indicators of Bank Liquidity and Leverage; B. Global Banks Versus Domestic Banks; C. Bank Failure; IV. Empirical Approach and Quantitative Results; A. Stylized Facts; B. Baseline Regressions; C. Are There Threshold Effects at Play?; D. Are There Differences Across Bank Types?; V. Robustness Check; VI. Concluding Remarks; VII. References; Figures; 1. Evolution of Structural Liquidity and Leverage Before the Crisis, 2001-07 327 $a2. Evolution of Structural Liquidity and Leverage by Failed and Non-Failed Banks3. Distributions of Pre-Crisis Liquidity and Leverage across Failed and Non-Failed; Tables; 1. Stylized Balance-Sheet and Weights to Compute the NSFR; 2. Sample Coverage by Region and Type; 3. Summary Statistics of Selected Variables, 2001-07; 4. Pairwise Correlations Between Selected Variables, 2001-07; 5. Baseline Regressions; 6. Estimates of the Marginal Impact on the Probabilities of Default; 7. Probit Regressions by Sub-Samples of Liquidity and Leverage; 8. Regressions by Bank Types 327 $a9. Results of Robustness Checks by Alternative Definitions of Liquidity and CapitalTable 10. Results of Robustness Checks by Sub-Components of Bank Failure 330 3 $aThis paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2012/029 606 $aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 606 $aBank failures$zDeveloped countries 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aIndustries: Financial Services$2imf 606 $aInvestments: Stocks$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aPortfolio Choice$2imf 606 $aInvestment Decisions$2imf 606 $aFinancial Crises$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: General$2imf 606 $aPension Funds$2imf 606 $aNon-bank Financial Institutions$2imf 606 $aFinancial Instruments$2imf 606 $aInstitutional Investors$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aFinancial services law & regulation$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aInvestment & securities$2imf 606 $aLiquidity requirements$2imf 606 $aLiquidity$2imf 606 $aFinancial crises$2imf 606 $aDistressed institutions$2imf 606 $aFinancial regulation and supervision$2imf 606 $aAsset and liability management$2imf 606 $aFinancial institutions$2imf 606 $aStocks$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 606 $aState supervision$2imf 606 $aEconomics$2imf 606 $aFinancial services industry$2imf 607 $aUnited States$2imf 615 0$aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. 615 0$aBank failures 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aIndustries: Financial Services 615 7$aInvestments: Stocks 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aPortfolio Choice 615 7$aInvestment Decisions 615 7$aFinancial Crises 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: General 615 7$aPension Funds 615 7$aNon-bank Financial Institutions 615 7$aFinancial Instruments 615 7$aInstitutional Investors 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aFinancial services law & regulation 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aInvestment & securities 615 7$aLiquidity requirements 615 7$aLiquidity 615 7$aFinancial crises 615 7$aDistressed institutions 615 7$aFinancial regulation and supervision 615 7$aAsset and liability management 615 7$aFinancial institutions 615 7$aStocks 615 7$aBanks and banking 615 7$aState supervision 615 7$aEconomics 615 7$aFinancial services industry 700 $aFederico$b Pablo$01497248 701 $aVazquez$b Francisco$0395343 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910789904003321 996 $aBank Funding Structures and Risk$93722294 997 $aUNINA