LEADER 04992nam 2200577 450 001 9910797232903321 005 20230807215937.0 010 $a0-19-985704-0 035 $a(CKB)3710000000432974 035 $a(EBL)2076390 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001517726 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12612569 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001517726 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11508351 035 $a(PQKB)11077413 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC2076390 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL2076390 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11067871 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL801966 035 $a(OCoLC)911387375 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000432974 100 $a20150701h20152015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aProblems from Reid /$fJames Van Cleve 210 1$aNew York, New York :$cOxford University Press,$d2015. 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (567 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-19-985703-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1. Sensation and Perception; A. Explanations of Terms; B. Sensation versus Perception; C. Reid's Threefold Account of Perception; D. The Conception in Perception; E. Perception and Belief; F. Consciousness and Attention; G. Are Sensations Self-Reflexive?; 2. Reid's Nativism; A. Reid's Nativism; B. Natural Signs; C. The Experimentum Crucis; D. Responses to the Experimentum Crucis; E. Woulds, Coulds, or Shoulds?; F. Nativism as an Antidote to Skepticism; 3. Direct Realism versus the Way of Ideas; A. The Way of Ideas 327 $aB. First Argument for the Way of Ideas: No Action at a DistanceC. Second Argument for the Way of Ideas: Hume's Table Argument; D. Third Argument for the Way of Ideas: Double Vision; E. Fourth Argument for the Way of Ideas: Malebranche's Master Argument; F. Three Forms of Direct Realism; G. Do Sensations Obstruct Direct Perception?; H. Is Reid a Presentational Direct Realist?; I. All Perception Is Direct Perception; 4. Primary and Secondary Qualities; A. Reid's Relation to Locke and Berkeley; B. The Real Foundation: Epistemological or Metaphysical?; C. Dispositions or Bases? 327 $aD. Intrinsic or Extrinsic?E. Fixed or Variable?; F. Four Views that Conflict with Reid's; 5. Acquired Perception; A. The Mechanics of Acquired Perception; B. Is Acquired Perception Really Perception?; C. Are Secondary Qualities Objects of Acquired Perception Only?; D. Does Acquired Perception Alter the Content of Our Original Perceptions?; E. Could Anything Become an Object of Acquired Perception?; F. Is Reid Inconsistent about the Requisites of Perception?; 6. The Geometry of Visibles; A. The Properties of Spherical Figures; B. Depth Is Not Perceived 327 $aC. The Argument from IndistinguishabilityD. Visibles as Sense Data; E. Coincidence as Identity; F. Angell's Approach; G. The Argument of Paragraph 4; H. The Real Basis of the Geometry of Visibles; I. Does the Geometry of Visibles Jeopardize Direct Realism?; J. What Are Visibles?; K. Direct Realism and Seeing What We Touch; L. Visible Figure as a Relativized Property of Ordinary Objects; M. Mediated but Direct?; 7. Erect and Inverted Vision; A. The Nai?ve Puzzle and Rock's Question; B. The Classical Solution; C. Berkeley's Solution(s) to the Nai?ve Puzzle 327 $aD. Reid's Alternative to Berkeley's SolutionE. Answers to Rock's Question; F. Experiments with Inverting Lenses; G. Perceptual Adaptation; 8. Molyneux's Question; A. Molyneux's Question; B. Empirical Evidence; C. Berkeley's Answer; D. Reid's Answer(s); E. Is Berkeley's Modus Tollens Reid's Modus Ponens?; F. The One-Two Molyneux Question; G. Concluding Confession; 9. Memory and Personal Identity; A. Things Obvious and Certain with Regard to Memory; B. Critique of the Impression and Idea Theories of Memory; C. Memory as Direct Awareness of Things Past; D. The Specious Present 327 $aE. Personal Identity 330 $aJames Van Cleve here shows why Thomas Reid (1710-96) deserves a place alongside the other canonical figures of modern philosophy. He expounds Reid's positions and arguments on a wide range of topics, taking interpretive stands on points where his meaning is disputed and assessing the value of his contributions to issues philosophers are discussing today. Among the topics Van Cleve explores are Reid's account of perception and its relation to sensation, conception, and belief; his nativist account of the origin of the concepts of space and power; his attempt to clear the way for the belief that 676 $a192 686 $aPHI004000$aPHI016000$2bisacsh 700 $aVan Cleve$b James$01468812 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910797232903321 996 $aProblems from Reid$93781241 997 $aUNINA LEADER 02283oam 2200481 450 001 9910789294303321 005 20190911112729.0 010 $a981-4566-01-2 035 $a(OCoLC)872114307 035 $a(MiFhGG)GVRL8RBL 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000092936 100 $a20131203h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurun|---uuuua 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aForcing for mathematicians /$fNik Weaver, Washington University in St. Louis, USA 210 1$aNew Jersey :$cWorld Scientific,$d[2014] 210 4$d?2014 215 $a1 online resource (x, 142 pages) 225 0 $aGale eBooks 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a981-4566-00-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a24. Suslin's Problem, II*25. Whitehead's Problem, II*; 26. The Open Coloring Axiom; 27. Self-Homeomorphisms of ?N \ N, II*; 28. Automorphisms of the Calkin Algebra, I*; 29. Automorphisms of the Calkin Algebra, II*; 30. The Multiverse Interpretation; Appendix A Forcing with Preorders; Exercises; Notes; Bibliography; Notation Index; Subject Index 330 $aEver since Paul Cohen's spectacular use of the forcing concept to prove the independence of the continuum hypothesis from the standard axioms of set theory, forcing has been seen by the general mathematical community as a subject of great intrinsic interest but one that is technically so forbidding that it is only accessible to specialists. In the past decade, a series of remarkable solutions to long-standing problems in C * -algebra using set-theoretic methods, many achieved by the author and his collaborators, have generated new interest in this subject. This is the first book aimed at expla 606 $aForcing (Model theory) 606 $aSet theory 606 $aAxiom of choice 606 $aContinuum hypothesis 615 0$aForcing (Model theory) 615 0$aSet theory. 615 0$aAxiom of choice. 615 0$aContinuum hypothesis. 676 $a511.3/4 700 $aWeaver$b Nik$0474411 801 0$bMiFhGG 801 1$bMiFhGG 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910789294303321 996 $aForcing for mathematicians$93721108 997 $aUNINA