LEADER 03661nam 2200613 450 001 9910789147203321 005 20230803201651.0 010 $a0-674-72811-4 010 $a0-674-72658-8 024 7 $a10.4159/harvard.9780674726581 035 $a(CKB)3710000000078977 035 $a(EBL)3301370 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001082553 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11631518 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001082553 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11101363 035 $a(PQKB)11124541 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3301370 035 $a(DE-B1597)213467 035 $a(OCoLC)867050097 035 $a(OCoLC)979627574 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674726581 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3301370 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10821147 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000078977 100 $a20130429d2014 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAspects of psychologism /$fTim Crane 210 1$aCambridge, Massachusetts :$cHarvard University Press,$d2014. 215 $a1 online resource (384 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-674-72457-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction : in defence of psychologism -- Brentano's concept of intentional inexistence -- Wittgenstein on intentionality -- The origins of qualia -- Intentionality as the mark of the mental -- Intentional objects -- The intentional structure of consciousness -- Intentionalism -- The non-conceptual content of experience -- Is there a perceptual relation? -- Is perception a propositional attitude? -- The given -- Unconscious belief and conscious thought -- Subjective facts -- Papineau on phenomenal concepts -- Tye on acquaintance and the problem of consciousness. 330 $aAspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view. How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane contends, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. Crane's claim is that intentionality--the "aboutness" or "directedness" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. He criticizes materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the position that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way, opening up philosophy to a more realistic account of the mind's nature. 606 $aPsychologism 606 $aPhenomenology 606 $aIntentionality (Philosophy) 615 0$aPsychologism. 615 0$aPhenomenology. 615 0$aIntentionality (Philosophy) 676 $a150.1 700 $aCrane$b Tim$0296016 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910789147203321 996 $aAspects of psychologism$93848832 997 $aUNINA