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100   $a20020129d2006      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aCorruption, Competition, and Contracts : $eA Model of Vote Buying /$fFelix Vardy, John Morgan
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006.
215   $a1 online resource (23 p.)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
300   $a"January 2006."
300   $a"IMF Institute."
311   $a1-4518-6271-7 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Variation in Contracts""; ""A. Contracting on Votes""; ""B. Contracting on Outcomes""; ""C. Contracting on Votes and Vote Shares""; ""IV. Related Literature""; ""V. Conclusions""; ""References""
330 3 $aIn the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/011
606   $aCorruption
606   $aCompetition
606   $aFinance: General$2imf
606   $aTaxation$2imf
606   $aCriminology$2imf
606   $aSocial Choice$2imf
606   $aClubs$2imf
606   $aCommittees$2imf
606   $aAssociations$2imf
606   $aModels of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior$2imf
606   $aPositive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation$2imf
606   $aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)$2imf
606   $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf
606   $aBureaucracy$2imf
606   $aAdministrative Processes in Public Organizations$2imf
606   $aCorruption$2imf
606   $aFinance$2imf
606   $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf
606   $aCorporate crime$2imf
606   $awhite-collar crime$2imf
606   $aCompetition$2imf
606   $aTax incentives$2imf
606   $aFinancial markets$2imf
606   $aCrime$2imf
607   $aUnited Kingdom$2imf
615  0$aCorruption.
615  0$aCompetition.
615  7$aFinance: General
615  7$aTaxation
615  7$aCriminology
615  7$aSocial Choice
615  7$aClubs
615  7$aCommittees
615  7$aAssociations
615  7$aModels of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
615  7$aPositive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
615  7$aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
615  7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
615  7$aBureaucracy
615  7$aAdministrative Processes in Public Organizations
615  7$aCorruption
615  7$aFinance
615  7$aPublic finance & taxation
615  7$aCorporate crime
615  7$awhite-collar crime
615  7$aCompetition
615  7$aTax incentives
615  7$aFinancial markets
615  7$aCrime
700   $aVardy$b Felix$01464136
701   $aMorgan$b John$0117117
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.
712 02$aIMF Fund.
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910788699203321
996   $aCorruption, Competition, and Contracts$93673700
997   $aUNINA