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100   $a20020129d2004      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aFiscal Surveillance in a Petro Zone : $eThe Case of the CEMAC /$fJohannes Wiegand
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2004.
215   $a1 online resource (28 p.)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-4518-4254-6 
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. METHODOLOGY""; ""A. Gap Analysis""; ""B. Sensitivity Analysis of the Market Value of Equity (MVE)""; ""C. Duration""; ""D. Value at Risk""; ""E. Issues in Estimating Interest Rate Risk Exposure of Banks""; ""F. Data Description""; ""III. RESULTS""; ""A. Cross Sectional Heterogeneity""; ""IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS""; ""References""
330 3 $aThis paper discusses fiscal surveillance criteria for the countries of the Central African Monetary and Economic Union (CEMAC), most of which depend heavily on oil exports. At present, the CEMAC's macroeconomic surveillance exercise sets as fiscal target a floor on the basic budgetary balance. This appears inadequate, for at least two reasons. First, fluctuations in oil prices and, hence, oil receipts obscure the underlying fiscal stance. Second, oil resources are limited, which suggests that some of today's oil receipts should be saved to finance future consumption. The paper develops easy-to-calculate indicators that take both aspects into account. A retrospective analysis based on these alternative indicators reveals that in recent years, the CEMAC's surveillance exercise has tended to accommodate stances of fiscal policy that are at odds with sound management of oil wealth.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2004/008
606   $aPolitical Science$2HILCC
606   $aLaw, Politics & Government$2HILCC
606   $aPublic Finance$2HILCC
606   $aInvestments: Energy$2imf
606   $aMacroeconomics$2imf
606   $aTaxation$2imf
606   $aIndustries: Energy$2imf
606   $aNational Deficit Surplus$2imf
606   $aEnergy: Government Policy$2imf
606   $aEnergy: General$2imf
606   $aEnergy: Demand and Supply$2imf
606   $aPrices$2imf
606   $aFiscal Policy$2imf
606   $aBusiness Taxes and Subsidies$2imf
606   $aMacroeconomics: Production$2imf
606   $aInvestment & securities$2imf
606   $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf
606   $aPetroleum, oil & gas industries$2imf
606   $aOil$2imf
606   $aOil prices$2imf
606   $aFiscal stance$2imf
606   $aOil, gas and mining taxes$2imf
606   $aOil production$2imf
606   $aCommodities$2imf
606   $aTaxes$2imf
606   $aFiscal policy$2imf
606   $aProduction$2imf
606   $aPetroleum industry and trade$2imf
607   $aEquatorial Guinea, Republic of$2imf
615  7$aPolitical Science
615  7$aLaw, Politics & Government
615  7$aPublic Finance
615  7$aInvestments: Energy
615  7$aMacroeconomics
615  7$aTaxation
615  7$aIndustries: Energy
615  7$aNational Deficit Surplus
615  7$aEnergy: Government Policy
615  7$aEnergy: General
615  7$aEnergy: Demand and Supply
615  7$aPrices
615  7$aFiscal Policy
615  7$aBusiness Taxes and Subsidies
615  7$aMacroeconomics: Production
615  7$aInvestment & securities
615  7$aPublic finance & taxation
615  7$aPetroleum, oil & gas industries
615  7$aOil
615  7$aOil prices
615  7$aFiscal stance
615  7$aOil, gas and mining taxes
615  7$aOil production
615  7$aCommodities
615  7$aTaxes
615  7$aFiscal policy
615  7$aProduction
615  7$aPetroleum industry and trade
700   $aWiegand$b Johannes$0820400
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910788525003321
996   $aFiscal Surveillance in a Petro Zone$93670971
997   $aUNINA