LEADER 04491oam 22010454 450 001 9910788521403321 005 20230829002228.0 010 $a1-4623-9016-1 010 $a1-4519-8633-5 010 $a1-282-39212-3 010 $a9786613820556 010 $a1-4519-0913-6 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443095 035 $a(EBL)3014538 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940824 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11519299 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940824 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10955521 035 $a(PQKB)11225520 035 $a(OCoLC)694141243 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014538 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006119 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443095 100 $a20020129d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes : $eEvidence From the Caribbean /$fRupa Duttagupta, Guillermo Tolosa 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006. 215 $a1 online resource (37 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"May 2006." 311 $a1-4518-6379-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. FIXED EXCHANGE RATES, CURRENCY UNIONS, AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE""; ""III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS""; ""IV. CONCLUSION""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aThis paper assesses the nature of fiscal discipline under alternative exchange rate regimes. First, it shows in a simple theoretical framework that fiscal agencies under a currency union with a fixed exchange rate can have the largest incentive to overspend or "free-ride" (compared to those under other exchange rate regimes) owing to their ability to spread the costs of overspending in terms of the inflation tax across both time-given the fixed exchange rate-and space-given the currency union. In contrast, such free-riding behavior does not arise under flexible regimes owing to the immediate inflationary impact of spending. Next, empirically, it shows that fiscal stances in countries with fixed pegs and currency unions regime demonstrate greater free-riding behavior than countries with more flexible regimes in 15 Caribbean countries during 1983-2004. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/119 606 $aFiscal policy$zCaribbean Area$xEconometric models 606 $aForeign exchange rates$zCaribbean Area$xEconometric models 606 $aExports and Imports$2imf 606 $aForeign Exchange$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aComparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aStabilization$2imf 606 $aTreasury Policy$2imf 606 $aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions$2imf 606 $aFiscal Policy$2imf 606 $aFinancial Aspects of Economic Integration$2imf 606 $aCurrency$2imf 606 $aForeign exchange$2imf 606 $aInternational economics$2imf 606 $aExchange rate arrangements$2imf 606 $aConventional peg$2imf 606 $aFiscal stance$2imf 606 $aFiscal policy$2imf 606 $aMonetary unions$2imf 606 $aEconomic integration$2imf 607 $aAntigua and Barbuda$2imf 615 0$aFiscal policy$xEconometric models. 615 0$aForeign exchange rates$xEconometric models. 615 7$aExports and Imports 615 7$aForeign Exchange 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aComparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy 615 7$aStabilization 615 7$aTreasury Policy 615 7$aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions 615 7$aFiscal Policy 615 7$aFinancial Aspects of Economic Integration 615 7$aCurrency 615 7$aForeign exchange 615 7$aInternational economics 615 7$aExchange rate arrangements 615 7$aConventional peg 615 7$aFiscal stance 615 7$aFiscal policy 615 7$aMonetary unions 615 7$aEconomic integration 700 $aDuttagupta$b Rupa$01462085 701 $aTolosa$b Guillermo$01462086 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bWestern Hemisphere Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788521403321 996 $aFiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes$93670936 997 $aUNINA