LEADER 04675oam 22010334 450 001 9910788414603321 005 20230721050918.0 010 $a1-4623-6088-2 010 $a1-4527-5113-7 010 $a1-283-51148-7 010 $a1-4519-1025-8 010 $a9786613823939 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443387 035 $a(EBL)1608457 035 $a(OCoLC)568151181 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608457 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2007008 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443387 100 $a20020129d2007 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aCollateral Damage : $eExchange Controls and International Trade /$fZhiwei Zhang, Shang-Jin Wei 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2007. 215 $a1 online resource (41 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"January 2007." 311 $a1-4518-6572-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 14-15). 327 $aCover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Exchange Controls: Some Basic Patterns; 1. Evolutions of Restriction Indices; 1a. Summary Statistics for Restriction Indices; 1b. Correlations of the Control Indices, Tariff, and NTB Index; 2. Control Indices in Selected Countries; III. Statistical Analysis; 2. Benchmark Regressions; 3. Adding Time-varying Price Indices; 4. Developing Countries; 5. Additional Controls: Corruption and Trade Openness; 6. Finer Classification of Exchange Controls; 7. Emerging Market Economies during 1996-99; IV. Concluding Remarks 327 $a1. Exchange Controls: Source, Measurement, and Indices 2. List of Countries in the Sample; References; Footnotes 330 3 $aWhile new conventional wisdom warns that developing countries should be aware of the risks of premature capital account liberalization, the costs of not removing exchange controls have received much less attention. This paper investigates the negative effects of exchange controls on trade. To minimize evasion of controls, countries often intensify inspections at the border and increase documentation requirements. Thus, the cost of conducting trade rises. The paper finds that a one standard-deviation increase in the controls on trade payment has the same negative effect on trade as an increase in tariff by about 14 percentage points. A one standard-deviation increase in the controls on FX transactions reduces trade by the same amount as a rise in tariff by 11 percentage points. Therefore, the collateral damage in terms of foregone trade is sizable. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2007/008 606 $aForeign exchange$xLaw and legislation 606 $aInternational trade 606 $aBalance of payments 606 $aNon-tariff trade barriers 606 $aExports and Imports$2imf 606 $aForeign Exchange$2imf 606 $aTaxation$2imf 606 $aInternational Investment$2imf 606 $aLong-term Capital Movements$2imf 606 $aTrade Policy$2imf 606 $aInternational Trade Organizations$2imf 606 $aTrade: General$2imf 606 $aCurrency$2imf 606 $aForeign exchange$2imf 606 $aInternational economics$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aExchange restrictions$2imf 606 $aCapital controls$2imf 606 $aTariffs$2imf 606 $aImports$2imf 606 $aCapital movements$2imf 606 $aTariff$2imf 607 $aChile$2imf 615 0$aForeign exchange$xLaw and legislation. 615 0$aInternational trade. 615 0$aBalance of payments. 615 0$aNon-tariff trade barriers. 615 7$aExports and Imports 615 7$aForeign Exchange 615 7$aTaxation 615 7$aInternational Investment 615 7$aLong-term Capital Movements 615 7$aTrade Policy 615 7$aInternational Trade Organizations 615 7$aTrade: General 615 7$aCurrency 615 7$aForeign exchange 615 7$aInternational economics 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aExchange restrictions 615 7$aCapital controls 615 7$aTariffs 615 7$aImports 615 7$aCapital movements 615 7$aTariff 676 $a343.032 700 $aZhang$b Zhiwei$01400451 701 $aWei$b Shang-Jin$0118987 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bResearch Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788414603321 996 $aCollateral Damage$93802282 997 $aUNINA