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010   $a9786613827470
010   $a1-4519-0990-X
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035   $a(EBL)3014516
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035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940728
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10955824
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035   $a(OCoLC)694141213
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014516
035   $a(IMF)WPIEE2006277
035   $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443675
100   $a20020129d2006      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aElements of Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Design
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006.
215   $a1 online resource (40 p.)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
300   $a"December 2006."
311   $a1-4518-6537-6 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A LARGE DIVERSITY OF MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES""; ""III. NORMATIVE ISSUES IN MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE DESIGN""; ""IV. PREFERENCE AGGREGATION IN MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES""; ""V. BELIEF AGGREGATION IN MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES""; ""VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. REFERENCES""
330 3 $aThe move from individual decision making to committee decision making is widely seen as a major evolution in contemporary central banking. This paper reviews the relevant economics and social psychology literatures with a view to providing some insights into the question of optimal monetary policy committee design. While the preference aggregation literature points to the effect of committee structure on the extent of the time inconsistency problem and its associated costs, the belief aggregation literature analyzes how different committee structures affect the efficiency of information pooling, the process of social influence, and collective accuracy. In conclusion, we highlight the main tradeoffs that the analysis has brought to light and point to directions for future research.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/277
606   $aCommittees
606   $aMonetary policy$xDecision making
606   $aBanks and Banking$2imf
606   $aInflation$2imf
606   $aPublic Finance$2imf
606   $aTaxation$2imf
606   $aBanks$2imf
606   $aDepository Institutions$2imf
606   $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf
606   $aMortgages$2imf
606   $aPrice Level$2imf
606   $aDeflation$2imf
606   $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf
606   $aCentral Banks and Their Policies$2imf
606   $aBanking$2imf
606   $aMacroeconomics$2imf
606   $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf
606   $aCentral bank legislation$2imf
606   $aTax incentives$2imf
606   $aCommunications in revenue administration$2imf
606   $aBanks and banking$2imf
606   $aPrices$2imf
606   $aRevenue$2imf
607   $aUnited Kingdom$2imf
615  0$aCommittees.
615  0$aMonetary policy$xDecision making.
615  7$aBanks and Banking
615  7$aInflation
615  7$aPublic Finance
615  7$aTaxation
615  7$aBanks
615  7$aDepository Institutions
615  7$aMicro Finance Institutions
615  7$aMortgages
615  7$aPrice Level
615  7$aDeflation
615  7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
615  7$aCentral Banks and Their Policies
615  7$aBanking
615  7$aMacroeconomics
615  7$aPublic finance & taxation
615  7$aCentral bank legislation
615  7$aTax incentives
615  7$aCommunications in revenue administration
615  7$aBanks and banking
615  7$aPrices
615  7$aRevenue
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bMonetary and Capital Markets Dept.
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910788404203321
996   $aElements of Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Design$93850013
997   $aUNINA