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100   $a20020129d2006      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 14$aThe Size Distribution of Firms, Cournot, and Optimal Taxation /$fMark Gersovitz
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006.
215   $a1 online resource (28 p.)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
300   $a"December 2006".
311   $a1-4518-6531-7 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS IN AN UNTAXED ECONOMY""; ""III. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS AND THE SPECIFIC SALES TAX""; ""IV. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS AND THE AD VALOREM SALES TAX""; ""V. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS AND THE HYBRID PROFITS TAX""; ""VI. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS AND THE HYBRID PROFITS AND AD VALOREM TAXES""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
330 3 $aTax laws and administrations often treat different size firms differently. There is, however, little research on the consequences. As modeled here, oligopolists with different efficiencies determine the size distribution of firms. A government that maximizes a weighted sum of consumer surplus, profits, and tax receipts can tax firms with different efficiencies differently and provides a reference point for other, more restricted differential tax systems. Taxes include a specific sales tax, an ad valorem sales tax, and a profits tax with imperfect deductibility of capital cost, and a combination of the last two. In general there is a pattern of tax rates by efficiency of firm. It is heavily dependent on the social valuation of tax receipts. Analytic and simulation results are provided. When both ad valorem taxes and the imperfect profits tax are combined, simulations suggest that the former rate is higher and the latter rate is lower for relatively inefficient firms.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/271
606   $aTaxation
606   $aIndustrial organization (Economic theory)
606   $aFinance: General$2imf
606   $aTaxation$2imf
606   $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf
606   $aTax Law$2imf
606   $aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)$2imf
606   $aEfficiency$2imf
606   $aOptimal Taxation$2imf
606   $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf
606   $aTaxation & duties law$2imf
606   $aFinance$2imf
606   $aIncome tax systems$2imf
606   $aTax law$2imf
606   $aCompetition$2imf
606   $aOptimal taxation$2imf
606   $aTax administration core functions$2imf
606   $aIncome tax$2imf
606   $aTax administration and procedure$2imf
606   $aLaw and legislation$2imf
607   $aCameroon$2imf
615  0$aTaxation.
615  0$aIndustrial organization (Economic theory)
615  7$aFinance: General
615  7$aTaxation
615  7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
615  7$aTax Law
615  7$aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
615  7$aEfficiency
615  7$aOptimal Taxation
615  7$aPublic finance & taxation
615  7$aTaxation & duties law
615  7$aFinance
615  7$aIncome tax systems
615  7$aTax law
615  7$aCompetition
615  7$aOptimal taxation
615  7$aTax administration core functions
615  7$aIncome tax
615  7$aTax administration and procedure
615  7$aLaw and legislation
700   $aGersovitz$b Mark$0128643
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910788401503321
996   $aThe Size Distribution of Firms, Cournot, and Optimal Taxation$93849986
997   $aUNINA