LEADER 06694oam 22012014 450 001 9910788349003321 005 20230721045608.0 010 $a1-4623-0936-4 010 $a1-4527-1173-9 010 $a1-4518-7169-4 010 $a1-282-84244-7 010 $a9786612842443 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055183 035 $a(EBL)1608141 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000942129 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11543355 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000942129 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10971846 035 $a(PQKB)10921618 035 $a(OCoLC)465418354 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608141 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009022 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055183 100 $a20020129d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$a?Monetary and Fiscal Rules in an Emerging Small Open Economy? /$fPaul Levine, Joseph Pearlman, Nicoletta Batini 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2009. 215 $a1 online resource (80 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1605-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Households; B. Firms; C. The Government Budget Constraint and Foreign Asset Accumulation; D. The Equilibrium; E. Specialization of the Household's Utility Function; F. State Space Representation; G. The Small Open Economy; H. Calibration; III. Monetary Policy Interest Rate Rules; IV. Fiscal Rules; A. A Conventional Fiscal Rule; B. The Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule; V. Imposing the Nominal Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound; VI. Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Financial Frictions; A. Imposing the ZLB; Figures; 1. Imposition of ZLB: Model I 327 $a2. Imposition of ZLB: Model IIIB. Welfare Decomposition; C. Impulse Responses; 3. Impulse Responses to a-1 Percent Technology Shock. Models I, II, and III; VII. The Performance of Optimized Simple Rules; 4. Imposition of ZLB: Flex(D)+Conventional Fiscal Rule, Model I; 5. Imposition of ZLB: Flex(D)+Conventional Fiscal Rule: Model III; VIII. Conclusions; Tables; 1. Notation for Prices; 2. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimal Policy: No ZLB Constraint; 3. Optimal Policy with a ZLB Constraint: Monetary Policy Only for Model I 327 $a4. Optimal Commitment with a ZLB Constraint. Monetary Plus Fiscal Policy for Model I5. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimal Policy: ZLB Constraint; 6. Welfare Decomposition of Shocks; 7. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimized Simple Rules: FLEX (D) with a Conventional Fiscal Rule. Models I, II and III; 8. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimized Simple Rules: FIX with a Conventional Fiscal Rule. Models I, II and III; 9. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimized Simple Rules: FLEX(C) with a Conventional Fiscal Rule. Models I, II and III 327 $a10. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimized Simple Rules: FLEX(D) with a Modified SFSR. Models I, II and IIIAppendixes; 1. The Steady State; 2. Linearization; 3. Calibration and Estimation; 4. Quadratic Approximation of the Welfare Loss 330 3 $aWe develop a optimal rules-based interpretation of the 'three pillars macroeconomic policy framework': a combination of a freely floating exchange rate, an explicit target for inflation, and a mechanism than ensures a stable government debt-GDP ratio around a specified long run. We show how such monetary-fiscal rules need to be adjusted to accommodate specific features of emerging market economies. The model takes the form of two-blocs, a DSGE emerging small open economy interacting with the rest of the world and features, in particular, financial frictions It is calibrated using Chile and US data. Alongside the optimal Ramsey policy benchmark, we model the three pillars as simple monetary and fiscal rules including and both domestic and CPI inflation targeting interest rate rules alongside a 'Structural Surplus Fiscal Rule' as followed recently in Chile. A comparison with a fixed exchange rate regime is made. We find that domestic inflation targeting is superior to partially or implicitly (through a CPI inflation target) or fully attempting to stabilizing the exchange rate. Financial frictions require fiscal policy to play a bigger role and lead to an increase in the costs associated with simple rules as opposed to the fully optimal policy. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2009/022 606 $aMonetary policy$zDeveloping countries 606 $aFiscal policy$zDeveloping countries 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aMoney and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aFiscal Policy$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics: Consumption$2imf 606 $aSaving$2imf 606 $aWealth$2imf 606 $aInterest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects$2imf 606 $aMonetary Systems$2imf 606 $aStandards$2imf 606 $aRegimes$2imf 606 $aGovernment and the Monetary System$2imf 606 $aPayment Systems$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aMonetary economics$2imf 606 $aConsumption$2imf 606 $aFiscal policy$2imf 606 $aFiscal rules$2imf 606 $aZero lower bound$2imf 606 $aCurrencies$2imf 606 $aEconomics$2imf 606 $aInterest rates$2imf 606 $aMoney$2imf 607 $aChile$2imf 615 0$aMonetary policy 615 0$aFiscal policy 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aMoney and Monetary Policy 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aFiscal Policy 615 7$aMacroeconomics: Consumption 615 7$aSaving 615 7$aWealth 615 7$aInterest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects 615 7$aMonetary Systems 615 7$aStandards 615 7$aRegimes 615 7$aGovernment and the Monetary System 615 7$aPayment Systems 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aMonetary economics 615 7$aConsumption 615 7$aFiscal policy 615 7$aFiscal rules 615 7$aZero lower bound 615 7$aCurrencies 615 7$aEconomics 615 7$aInterest rates 615 7$aMoney 700 $aLevine$b Paul$0127428 701 $aPearlman$b Joseph$01491222 701 $aBatini$b Nicoletta$01491223 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788349003321 996 $a?Monetary and Fiscal Rules in an Emerging Small Open Economy?$93712969 997 $aUNINA