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100   $a20020129d2008      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcnu||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aDo Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy? /$fPrachi Mishra, Giovanni Facchini, Anna Maria Mayda
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008.
215   $a1 online resource (58 pages) $cillustrations (some color)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
225  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/244
300   $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
311   $a1-4519-1555-1 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
330 3 $aWhile anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2008/244
606   $aLobbying$zUnited States$xEconometric models
606   $aLabor$2imf
606   $aMacroeconomics$2imf
606   $aPublic Finance$2imf
606   $aEmigration and Immigration$2imf
606   $aInternational Migration$2imf
606   $aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General$2imf
606   $aLabor Economics: General$2imf
606   $aUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search$2imf
606   $aLabor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General$2imf
606   $aMigration, immigration & emigration$2imf
606   $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf
606   $aLabour$2imf
606   $aincome economics$2imf
606   $aTrade unions$2imf
606   $aMigration$2imf
606   $aExpenditure$2imf
606   $aUnemployment rate$2imf
606   $aLabor unions$2imf
606   $aEmigration and immigration$2imf
606   $aExpenditures, Public$2imf
606   $aLabor economics$2imf
606   $aUnemployment$2imf
607   $aUnited States$xEmigration and immigration$xGovernment policy$xEconometric models
607   $aUnited States$2imf
615  0$aLobbying$xEconometric models.
615  7$aLabor
615  7$aMacroeconomics
615  7$aPublic Finance
615  7$aEmigration and Immigration
615  7$aInternational Migration
615  7$aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
615  7$aLabor Economics: General
615  7$aUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
615  7$aLabor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
615  7$aMigration, immigration & emigration
615  7$aPublic finance & taxation
615  7$aLabour
615  7$aincome economics
615  7$aTrade unions
615  7$aMigration
615  7$aExpenditure
615  7$aUnemployment rate
615  7$aLabor unions
615  7$aEmigration and immigration
615  7$aExpenditures, Public
615  7$aLabor economics
615  7$aUnemployment
676   $a324.40973
700   $aMishra$b Prachi$01090676
701   $aFacchini$b Giovanni$01493489
701   $aMayda$b Anna Maria$01493490
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910788343803321
996   $aDo Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy$93716489
997   $aUNINA