LEADER 04752oam 22012254 450 001 9910788342903321 005 20230721045628.0 010 $a1-4623-9312-8 010 $a1-282-84201-3 010 $a1-4518-7108-2 010 $a1-4527-4503-X 010 $a9786612842016 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055145 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001488770 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11995298 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001488770 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11463816 035 $a(PQKB)10255187 035 $a(OCoLC)460638675 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1586707 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2008250 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055145 100 $a20020129d2008 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises /$fLuc Laeven, Fabian Valencia 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 215 $a1 online resource (45 pages) $cillustrations, tables 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/250 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-4519-1561-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 3 $aIn episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2008/250 606 $aBank failures 606 $aFinancial crises 606 $aMoral hazard 606 $aDeposit insurance 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aExports and Imports$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aPortfolio Choice$2imf 606 $aInvestment Decisions$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aInternational Investment$2imf 606 $aLong-term Capital Movements$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aInternational economics$2imf 606 $aBlanket guarantee$2imf 606 $aLiquidity$2imf 606 $aBank resolution$2imf 606 $aForeign liabilities$2imf 606 $aCrisis management$2imf 606 $aEconomics$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 606 $aInvestments, Foreign$2imf 607 $aTurkey$2imf 615 0$aBank failures. 615 0$aFinancial crises. 615 0$aMoral hazard. 615 0$aDeposit insurance. 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aExports and Imports 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aPortfolio Choice 615 7$aInvestment Decisions 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aInternational Investment 615 7$aLong-term Capital Movements 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aInternational economics 615 7$aBlanket guarantee 615 7$aLiquidity 615 7$aBank resolution 615 7$aForeign liabilities 615 7$aCrisis management 615 7$aEconomics 615 7$aBanks and banking 615 7$aInvestments, Foreign 676 $a332.1 700 $aLaeven$b Luc$01463965 701 $aValencia$b Fabian$01493480 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788342903321 996 $aThe Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises$93716480 997 $aUNINA