LEADER 05171oam 22011054 450 001 9910788339703321 005 20230721045654.0 010 $a1-4623-3559-4 010 $a1-4527-5814-X 010 $a9786612843037 010 $a1-4518-7230-5 010 $a1-282-84303-6 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055216 035 $a(EBL)1608208 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001476990 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11914269 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001476990 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11449384 035 $a(PQKB)10384385 035 $a(OCoLC)503190350 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608208 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009083 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055216 100 $a20020129d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aHold Your Nose and Vote : $eWhy Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? /$fMarco Pani 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2009. 215 $a1 online resource (34 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1665-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References 330 3 $aThis paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, some citizens can indirectly benefit from corruption. The paper shows that, under this condition, if the citizens anticipate a shift in policy preferences in favor of higher public expenditure, they may support institutional arrangements that favor corruption (such as a weak enforcement of the law) in order to alter future policy decisions in their favor. This result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in a democracyto some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system. It also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2009/083 606 $aPolitical corruption 606 $aDemocracy 606 $aBudgeting$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aTaxation$2imf 606 $aPolitical Economy$2imf 606 $aCriminology$2imf 606 $aBureaucracy$2imf 606 $aAdministrative Processes in Public Organizations$2imf 606 $aCorruption$2imf 606 $aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General$2imf 606 $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf 606 $aNational Budget$2imf 606 $aBudget Systems$2imf 606 $aCorporate crime$2imf 606 $awhite-collar crime$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aPolitical economy$2imf 606 $aBudgeting & financial management$2imf 606 $aExpenditure$2imf 606 $aTax incentives$2imf 606 $aBudget planning and preparation$2imf 606 $aExpenditures, Public$2imf 606 $aEconomics$2imf 606 $aBudget$2imf 607 $aItaly$2imf 615 0$aPolitical corruption. 615 0$aDemocracy. 615 7$aBudgeting 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aTaxation 615 7$aPolitical Economy 615 7$aCriminology 615 7$aBureaucracy 615 7$aAdministrative Processes in Public Organizations 615 7$aCorruption 615 7$aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General 615 7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General 615 7$aNational Budget 615 7$aBudget Systems 615 7$aCorporate crime 615 7$awhite-collar crime 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aPolitical economy 615 7$aBudgeting & financial management 615 7$aExpenditure 615 7$aTax incentives 615 7$aBudget planning and preparation 615 7$aExpenditures, Public 615 7$aEconomics 615 7$aBudget 700 $aPani$b Marco$01493451 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788339703321 996 $aHold Your Nose and Vote$93716448 997 $aUNINA