LEADER 04815oam 22010694 450 001 9910788232403321 005 20230721045650.0 010 $a1-4623-4873-4 010 $a1-4527-2990-5 010 $a1-4518-7046-9 010 $a9786612841392 010 $a1-282-84139-4 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055087 035 $a(EBL)1607971 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000944149 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11506473 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000944149 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10982921 035 $a(PQKB)10621924 035 $a(OCoLC)761918279 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607971 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2008188 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055087 100 $a20020129d2008 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aInnovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 215 $a1 online resource (30 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/188 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1499-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; Figures; 1. Change in the ratio of credit to GDP, 2003-2007; II. The Model; Tables; 1. Expected Payoffs in Different States; III. Model Analysis; A. Full Information; B. Equilibria with Partial Information and Two Bank Types; Pooling; Separating; A parameterized example; C. Separating Equilibrium with Partial Information and a Continuum of Bank Types; 2. The Value Function for Different Types: Separating Equilibrium; IV. Extensions; A. Investment in Loan Technology; 3. Credit Volumes and Bank Characteristics for a Continuum of Types 327 $a2. Investment Decision Starting From and Ending at Pooling EquilibriaB. Pervasive Moral Hazard and Low-Credit Outcomes; 3. Investment Decision Starting From and Ending at Separating Equilibria; 4. Separating Equilibrium with Low Credit Volume; V. Summary and Conclusions; 5. Pooling Equilibrium with Low Credit Volume; References; Appendix; I: Expected Loan Losses in a Pooling Equilibrium; II: Regularity Conditions on the Objective Function with a Continuum of Bank Types 330 3 $aThe volume of credit extended by a bank can be an informative signal of its abilities in loan selection and management. It is shown that, under asymmetric information, banks may therefore rationally lend more than they would otherwise in order to demonstrate their quality, thus negatively affecting financial system soundness. Small shifts in technology and uncertainty associated with new technology may lead to large jumps in equilibrium outcomes. Prudential measures and supervision are therefore warranted. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2008/188 606 $aBank loans$xEconometric models 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aMoney and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aIndustries: Financial Services$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General$2imf 606 $aInnovation$2imf 606 $aResearch and Development$2imf 606 $aTechnological Change$2imf 606 $aIntellectual Property Rights: General$2imf 606 $aMonetary economics$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aTechnology$2imf 606 $ageneral issues$2imf 606 $aCredit$2imf 606 $aBank credit$2imf 606 $aLoans$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 607 $aUnited States$2imf 615 0$aBank loans$xEconometric models. 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aMoney and Monetary Policy 615 7$aIndustries: Financial Services 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General 615 7$aInnovation 615 7$aResearch and Development 615 7$aTechnological Change 615 7$aIntellectual Property Rights: General 615 7$aMonetary economics 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aTechnology 615 7$ageneral issues 615 7$aCredit 615 7$aBank credit 615 7$aLoans 615 7$aBanks and banking 676 $a332.1753 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788232403321 996 $aInnovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth$93704153 997 $aUNINA