LEADER 04584oam 22009374 450 001 9910788228203321 005 20230721045720.0 010 $a1-4623-8300-9 010 $a1-4527-5006-8 010 $a1-4518-7333-6 010 $a9786612843969 010 $a1-282-84396-6 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055334 035 $a(EBL)1608424 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000942995 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11566061 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000942995 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10994190 035 $a(PQKB)11641521 035 $a(OCoLC)527722840 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608424 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009186 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055334 100 $a20020129d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aOne Money, One Market?A Revised Benchmark /$fChristian Henn, Theo Eicher 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2009. 215 $a1 online resource (25 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"September 2009." 311 $a1-4519-1758-9 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Data; III. Empirical Implementation of the Gravity Model; IV. Multilateral Resistance and the Trade Effects of Currency Unions; V. Benchmark CU Trade Effects addressing Multilateral Resistance and Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity; VI. Sensitivity Analysis; VII. Conclusion; Tables; 1. Trade Effects of Currency Unions; 2. Sensitivity Analysis: Average Currency Union Effects on Trade; 3. Sensitivity Analysis: Trade Effects of Individual Currency Unions; Appendix Table; A1. Countries in Sample; A2. Membership and Observations for Currency Unions and Boards 327 $aA3. Membership in Preferential Trade AgreementsA4. Bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements; References 330 3 $aThe introduction of the euro generated substantial interest in measuring the impact of currency unions (CUs) on trade flows. Rose's (2000) initial estimates suggested a tripling of trade and created a literature in search of "more reasonable" CU effects. A recent meta-analysis of this literature shows that subsequent papers quantify CU trade impacts at 30-90 percent. However, most recent studies use shorter time series and fewer countries than Rose in his original work. We revisit Rose's original benchmark, extend the dataset, and address Baldwin's (2006) critiques regarding the proper specification of gravity models in large panels by simultaneously accounting for multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. This produces a robust average CU trade effect of 45 percent. Yet, the trade impacts of individual CUs vary substantially and are generally lower than those of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Our revised benchmark can be used as a yardstick for future studies to delineate how estimates differ due to new data or differences in econometric specifications. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2009/186 606 $aMonetary unions 606 $aTariff 606 $aFree trade 606 $aExports and Imports$2imf 606 $aForeign Exchange$2imf 606 $aTrade Policy$2imf 606 $aInternational Trade Organizations$2imf 606 $aFinancial Aspects of Economic Integration$2imf 606 $aInternational economics$2imf 606 $aCurrency$2imf 606 $aForeign exchange$2imf 606 $aPlurilateral trade$2imf 606 $aMonetary unions$2imf 606 $aExchange rates$2imf 606 $aMultilateral trade$2imf 606 $aInternational trade$2imf 607 $aUnited States$2imf 615 0$aMonetary unions. 615 0$aTariff. 615 0$aFree trade. 615 7$aExports and Imports 615 7$aForeign Exchange 615 7$aTrade Policy 615 7$aInternational Trade Organizations 615 7$aFinancial Aspects of Economic Integration 615 7$aInternational economics 615 7$aCurrency 615 7$aForeign exchange 615 7$aPlurilateral trade 615 7$aMonetary unions 615 7$aExchange rates 615 7$aMultilateral trade 615 7$aInternational trade 676 $a332.4566094 700 $aHenn$b Christian$01493519 701 $aEicher$b Theo$01176252 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bStrategy, Policy, and Review Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788228203321 996 $aOne Money, One Market?A Revised Benchmark$93741586 997 $aUNINA