LEADER 04279oam 22012254 450 001 9910788227903321 005 20230721045730.0 010 $a1-4623-1742-1 010 $a1-282-84402-4 010 $a9786612844027 010 $a1-4527-2181-5 010 $a1-4518-7340-9 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055339 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000941491 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11577297 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941491 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10982268 035 $a(PQKB)10134096 035 $a(OCoLC)649466035 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608810 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009193 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055339 100 $a20020129d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aInstitutional Inertia /$fLaura Valderrama 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2009. 215 $a25 p 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-4519-1764-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 3 $aWe study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce each other, leading to institutional inertia. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2009/193 606 $aTechnological innovations 606 $aIndustrial management 606 $aInvestments: Metals$2imf 606 $aLabor$2imf 606 $aProduction and Operations Management$2imf 606 $aInnovation$2imf 606 $aResearch and Development$2imf 606 $aTechnological Change$2imf 606 $aIntellectual Property Rights: General$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics: Production$2imf 606 $aMetals and Metal Products$2imf 606 $aCement$2imf 606 $aGlass$2imf 606 $aCeramics$2imf 606 $aHuman Capital$2imf 606 $aSkills$2imf 606 $aOccupational Choice$2imf 606 $aLabor Productivity$2imf 606 $aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General$2imf 606 $aTechnology$2imf 606 $ageneral issues$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aLabour$2imf 606 $aincome economics$2imf 606 $aInvestment & securities$2imf 606 $aProductivity$2imf 606 $aGold$2imf 606 $aHuman capital$2imf 606 $aWages$2imf 606 $aIndustrial productivity$2imf 607 $aUnited States$2imf 615 0$aTechnological innovations. 615 0$aIndustrial management. 615 7$aInvestments: Metals 615 7$aLabor 615 7$aProduction and Operations Management 615 7$aInnovation 615 7$aResearch and Development 615 7$aTechnological Change 615 7$aIntellectual Property Rights: General 615 7$aMacroeconomics: Production 615 7$aMetals and Metal Products 615 7$aCement 615 7$aGlass 615 7$aCeramics 615 7$aHuman Capital 615 7$aSkills 615 7$aOccupational Choice 615 7$aLabor Productivity 615 7$aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General 615 7$aTechnology 615 7$ageneral issues 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aLabour 615 7$aincome economics 615 7$aInvestment & securities 615 7$aProductivity 615 7$aGold 615 7$aHuman capital 615 7$aWages 615 7$aIndustrial productivity 700 $aValderrama$b Laura$01481162 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788227903321 996 $aInstitutional Inertia$93741583 997 $aUNINA