LEADER 04877oam 22012134 450 001 9910788224303321 005 20230721045706.0 010 $a1-4623-0026-X 010 $a1-282-84434-2 010 $a1-4527-7023-9 010 $a1-4518-7380-8 010 $a9786612844348 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055377 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940759 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11499073 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940759 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10956005 035 $a(PQKB)11478044 035 $a(OCoLC)680613667 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608857 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009233 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055377 100 $a20020129d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aExcessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations /$fAndréas Georgiou 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2009. 215 $a25 p. $cill 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"October 2009." 311 $a1-4519-1798-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 3 $aThe financial crisis that began in 2007 has brought to the fore the issues of excesses in lending, leverage, and risk-taking as some of the fundamental causes of this crisis. At the same time, in dealing with the financial crisis there have been large scale interventions by governments, often referred to as bailouts of the lenders. This paper presents a framework where rational economic agents engage in ex ante excessive lending, borrowing, and risk-taking if creditors assign a positive probability to being bailed out. The paper also offers some thoughts on policy implications. It argues that it would be most productive for the long run if lending institutions were not bailed out. If the continuing existence of an institution was deemed essential, assistance should take the form of capital injections that dilute the equity of existing owners. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2009/233 606 $aFinancial crises$xEconometric models 606 $aEconomic policy$xMathematical models 606 $aFinancial risk 606 $aCapital market 606 $aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aMoney and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aIndustries: Financial Services$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aFinancial Crises$2imf 606 $aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General$2imf 606 $aFinancing Policy$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk and Risk Management$2imf 606 $aCapital and Ownership Structure$2imf 606 $aValue of Firms$2imf 606 $aGoodwill$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aMonetary economics$2imf 606 $aFinancial services law & regulation$2imf 606 $aFinancial crises$2imf 606 $aCredit$2imf 606 $aLoans$2imf 606 $aProject loans$2imf 606 $aCredit risk$2imf 606 $aFinancial risk management$2imf 615 0$aFinancial crises$xEconometric models. 615 0$aEconomic policy$xMathematical models. 615 0$aFinancial risk. 615 0$aCapital market. 615 0$aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aMoney and Monetary Policy 615 7$aIndustries: Financial Services 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aFinancial Crises 615 7$aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General 615 7$aFinancing Policy 615 7$aFinancial Risk and Risk Management 615 7$aCapital and Ownership Structure 615 7$aValue of Firms 615 7$aGoodwill 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aMonetary economics 615 7$aFinancial services law & regulation 615 7$aFinancial crises 615 7$aCredit 615 7$aLoans 615 7$aProject loans 615 7$aCredit risk 615 7$aFinancial risk management 700 $aGeorgiou$b Andréas$01509581 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bStatistics Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788224303321 996 $aExcessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations$93741547 997 $aUNINA