LEADER 05945oam 22012734 450 001 9910788221903321 005 20230721045721.0 010 $a1-4623-1136-9 010 $a1-4527-8335-7 010 $a1-4518-7417-0 010 $a1-282-84459-8 010 $a9786612844591 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055401 035 $a(EBL)1606008 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001488803 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11842765 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001488803 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11445561 035 $a(PQKB)11063769 035 $a(OCoLC)671571362 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606008 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009272 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055401 100 $a20020129d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWho Disciplines Bank Managers? /$fAndrea Maechler, Klaus Schaeck, Martin Cihak, Stéphanie Marie Stolz 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2009. 215 $a1 online resource (76 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1833-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Hypothesis; III. Methodology and Data; A. Methodology; B. Variable Selection; C. Dataset; 1. Histogram of Total Assets; 1. Descriptive Statistics, Differences of Means and Medians, and Correlations; IV. Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; 2. Percentage Changes in Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; V. Multivariate Analysis; 3. Conditional Logit Models for Different Sources of Discipine; 4. Key Variables of Interest by Percentile of Z-Score 327 $a5. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment Group)6. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment and Control Group); 7. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Matching on Propensity Scores, Treatment, and Control Group; VI. Conclusions; I. Measuring Bank Soundness Using the Z-Score; II. Overview of Data and Sources; III. Turnovers in Small and Medium Sized U.S. Banks 1990-2007; IV. Robustness Checks; References; Footnotes 330 3 $aWe bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2009/272 606 $aBanks and banking 606 $aCorporate governance 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aCorporate Finance$2imf 606 $aEconometrics$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aDiscrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models$2imf 606 $aDiscrete Regressors$2imf 606 $aProportions$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aCorporate Finance and Governance: General$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aEconometrics & economic statistics$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aCorporate finance$2imf 606 $aBank soundness$2imf 606 $aLogit models$2imf 606 $aDeposit insurance$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 606 $aEconometric models$2imf 606 $aCrisis management$2imf 606 $aCorporations--Finance$2imf 607 $aUnited States$2imf 615 0$aBanks and banking. 615 0$aCorporate governance. 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aCorporate Finance 615 7$aEconometrics 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aDiscrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models 615 7$aDiscrete Regressors 615 7$aProportions 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aCorporate Finance and Governance: General 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aEconometrics & economic statistics 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aCorporate finance 615 7$aBank soundness 615 7$aLogit models 615 7$aDeposit insurance 615 7$aBanks and banking 615 7$aEconometric models 615 7$aCrisis management 615 7$aCorporations--Finance 700 $aMaechler$b Andrea$01493447 701 $aSchaeck$b Klaus$01509560 701 $aCihak$b Martin$01106217 701 $aStolz$b Stéphanie Marie$01485148 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788221903321 996 $aWho Disciplines Bank Managers$93741523 997 $aUNINA