LEADER 04235oam 22010934 450 001 9910788220703321 005 20230725040502.0 010 $a1-4623-0025-1 010 $a1-4519-6223-1 010 $a1-282-84527-6 010 $a1-4527-0868-1 010 $a9786612845277 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055419 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943053 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11523873 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943053 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10975309 035 $a(PQKB)11519156 035 $a(OCoLC)502478206 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606075 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2010018 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055419 100 $a20020129d2010 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aResponding to Banking Crises : $eLessons From Cross-Country Evidence /$fEnrica Detragiache, Giang Ho 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2010. 215 $a31 p 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-4519-1867-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 3 $aA common legacy of banking crises is a large increase in government debt, as fiscal resources are used to shore up the banking system. Do crisis response strategies that commit more fiscal resources lower the economic costs of crises? Based on evidence from a sample of 40 banking crises we find that the answer is negative. In fact, policies that are riskier for the government budget are associated with worse, not better, post-crisis performance. We also show that parliamentary political systems are more prone to adopt bank rescue measures that are costly for the government budget. We take advantage of this relationship to instrument the policy response, thereby addressing concerns of joint endogeneity. We find no evidence that endogeneity is a source of bias. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2010/018 606 $aFinancial crises 606 $aBanks and banking 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aFinancial Markets and the Macroeconomy$2imf 606 $aCentral Banks and Their Policies$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aFinancial Crises$2imf 606 $aCrisis Management$2imf 606 $aFiscal Policy$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aFinancial crises$2imf 606 $aBanking crises$2imf 606 $aCrisis resolution$2imf 606 $aCrisis management$2imf 606 $aFiscal policy$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 607 $aArgentina$2imf 615 0$aFinancial crises. 615 0$aBanks and banking. 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aFinancial Markets and the Macroeconomy 615 7$aCentral Banks and Their Policies 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aFinancial Crises 615 7$aCrisis Management 615 7$aFiscal Policy 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aFinancial crises 615 7$aBanking crises 615 7$aCrisis resolution 615 7$aCrisis management 615 7$aFiscal policy 615 7$aBanks and banking 700 $aDetragiache$b Enrica$0120810 701 $aHo$b Giang$01509546 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788220703321 996 $aResponding to Banking Crises$93741511 997 $aUNINA