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024 7 $a10.4324/9781315712581 
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035   $a(OCoLC)910446061
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100   $a20180706d2015      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aConceptual change and the philosophy of science $ealternative interpretations of the a priori /$fDavid J. Stump
210  1$aNew York :$cRoutledge,$d2015.
215   $a1 online resource (195 p.)
225 1 $aRoutledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-138-89013-8 
311   $a1-317-49538-1 
327   $a""8 On the Role of Mathematics in Physical Theory""""9 Epilogue: A Pragmatic Theory of the Constitutive Elements in Science""; ""Index""
330   $aIn this book, David Stump traces alternative conceptions of the a priori in the philosophy of science and defends a unique position in the current debates over conceptual change and the constitutive elements in science. Stump emphasizes the unique epistemological status of the constitutive elements of scientific theories, constitutive elements being the necessary preconditions that must be assumed in order to conduct a particular scientific inquiry. These constitutive elements, such as logic, mathematics, and even some fundamental laws of nature, were once taken to be a priori knowledge but ca
410  0$aRoutledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science
606   $aScience -- Philosophy
615  4$aScience -- Philosophy.
676   $a501
700   $aStump$b David J.$01539987
801  0$bAU-PeEL
801  1$bAU-PeEL
801  2$bAU-PeEL
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910788133703321
996   $aConceptual change and the philosophy of science$93791308
997   $aUNINA