LEADER 04078nam 2200661 450 001 9910788114003321 005 20220916114752.0 024 7 $a10.7312/eric17096 035 $a(CKB)2670000000612263 035 $a(EBL)1974588 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001458403 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12603631 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001458403 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11452136 035 $a(PQKB)10494776 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001248515 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1974588 035 $a(DE-B1597)458316 035 $a(OCoLC)979577730 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780231539036 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1974588 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11050147 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL776832 035 $a(OCoLC)917153068 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000612263 100 $a20141009h20152015 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDangerous trade $earms exports, human rights, and International reputation /$fJennifer L. Erickson 210 1$aNew York :$cColumbia University Press,$d[2015] 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (287 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-231-53903-7 311 $a0-231-17096-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction and overview -- "Responsible" arms transfer policy and the politics of social reputation -- History and contemporary trends in conventional arms export controls -- Explaining commitment : international reputation and "responsible" arms transfer -- Policy -- Explaining compliance : domestic reputation and arms trade scandal -- Conclusions and implications -- Appendix A. multilateral conventional arms control in the twentieth century -- Appendix B. Data sources and coding -- Appendix C. Full statistical results. 330 $aThe United Nations groundbreaking Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which went into effect in 2014, sets legally binding standards to regulate global arms exports and reflects the growing concerns toward the significant role that small and major conventional arms play in perpetuating human rights violations, conflict, and societal instability worldwide. Many countries that once staunchly opposed shared export controls and their perceived threat to political and economic autonomy are now beginning to embrace numerous agreements, such as the ATT and the EU Code of Conduct. Jennifer L. Erickson explores the reasons top arms-exporting democracies have put aside past sovereignty, security, and economic worries in favor of humanitarian arms transfer controls, and she follows the early effects of this about-face on export practice. She begins with a brief history of failed arms export control initiatives and then tracks arms transfer trends over time. Pinpointing the normative shifts in the 1990's that put humanitarian arms control on the table, she reveals that these states committed to these policies out of concern for their international reputations. She also highlights how arms trade scandals threaten domestic reputations and thus help improve compliance. Using statistical data and interviews conducted in France, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Erickson challenges existing IR theories of state behavior while providing insight into the role of reputation as a social mechanism and the importance of government transparency and accountability in generating compliance with new norms and rules. 606 $aArms transfers$xLaw and legislation 606 $aArms control 606 $aExport controls 606 $aHuman rights 615 0$aArms transfers$xLaw and legislation. 615 0$aArms control. 615 0$aExport controls. 615 0$aHuman rights. 676 $a382/.456234 700 $aErickson$b Jennifer L.$01549178 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788114003321 996 $aDangerous trade$93806928 997 $aUNINA