LEADER 03835nam 2200661 450 001 9910788113403321 005 20210511015646.0 024 7 $a10.7312/smit17000 035 $a(CKB)2670000000612264 035 $a(EBL)1974562 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001459686 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11917374 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001459686 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11464644 035 $a(PQKB)11273671 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001252325 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1974562 035 $a(DE-B1597)458512 035 $a(OCoLC)979953877 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780231539128 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1974562 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11050032 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL776836 035 $a(OCoLC)908091712 035 $a(PPN)18752680X 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000612264 100 $a20140828h20152015 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnnu---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe political impossibility of modern counterinsurgency $estrategic problems, puzzles, and paradoxes /$fM. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones 210 1$aNew York :$cColumbiaUniversity Press,$d[2015] 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (289 p.) 225 1 $aColumbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-231-53912-6 311 $a0-231-17000-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$tIntroduction --$t1. What Is Counterinsurgency Meant to Counter? The Puzzle of Insurgency --$t2. Counterinsurgency and Strategy: Problems and Paradoxes --$t3. Counterinsurgency and the Ideology of Modernization --$t4. The Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency and Globalization --$t5. The Illusion of Tradition: Myths and Paradoxes of British Counterinsurgency --$t6. The Puzzle of Counterinsurgency and Escalation --$tConclusion --$tNotes --$tBibliography --$tIndex 330 $aThe counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency-a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization. 410 0$aColumbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare. 606 $aCounterinsurgency$xHistory$y21st century 606 $aTerrorism$xHistory$y21st century 615 0$aCounterinsurgency$xHistory 615 0$aTerrorism$xHistory 676 $a355.02/18 700 $aSmith$b M. L. R$g(Michael Lawrence Rowan),$f1963-$012812 702 $aJones$b David Martin$f1950- 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788113403321 996 $aThe political impossibility of modern counterinsurgency$93806922 997 $aUNINA