LEADER 04433nam 2200745 450 001 9910788012203321 005 20220920153919.0 010 $a1-5017-5204-9 010 $a0-8014-5549-9 010 $a0-8014-5550-2 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801455506 035 $a(CKB)2670000000606927 035 $a(EBL)3138723 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001461578 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12632378 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001461578 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11471982 035 $a(PQKB)10421718 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001510128 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138723 035 $a(OCoLC)966910404 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse51772 035 $a(DE-B1597)478236 035 $a(OCoLC)905903169 035 $a(OCoLC)979576892 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801455506 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138723 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11040193 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL759707 035 $a(OCoLC)922998517 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000606927 100 $a20150417h20152015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|nu---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aTo kill nations $eAmerican strategy in the air-atomic age and the rise of mutually assured destruction /$fEdward Kaplan 210 1$aIthaca, NY :$cCornell University Press,$d2015. 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (viii, 260 pages) $c1 illustration 300 $aIncludes index. 311 0 $a0-8014-5248-1 311 0 $a1-336-28421-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 229-252) and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tPreface --$tIntroduction: Prevail --$t1. Antecedents --$t2. Declaration, Action, and the Air-Atomic Strategy --$t3. Finding a Place --$t4. The Fantastic Compression of Time --$t5. To Kill a Nation --$t6. Stalemate, Finite Deterrence, Polaris, and SIOP-62 --$t7. New Sheriff in Town --$t8. End of an Era --$tConclusion: Survive --$tKey to Sources and Abbreviations --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aBetween 1945 and 1950, the United States had a global nuclear monopoly. The A-bomb transformed the nation's strategic airpower and saw the Air Force displace the Navy at the front line of American defense. In To Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950-1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. The shift to mutually assured destruction (MAD) via general nuclear exchange steadily took precedence in strategic thinking and budget allocations. Soon American nuclear-armed airborne bomber fleets shaped for conventionally defined-if implausible, then impossible-victory were supplanted by missile-based forces designed to survive and punish. The Air Force receded from the forefront of American security policy. Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles. 606 $aNuclear warfare$xGovernment policy$zUnited States$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aNuclear weapons$xGovernment policy$zUnited States$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aAir warfare$xGovernment policy$zUnited States$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aAir power$zUnited States$xPhilosophy$xHistory$y20th century 607 $aUnited States$xMilitary policy 615 0$aNuclear warfare$xGovernment policy$xHistory 615 0$aNuclear weapons$xGovernment policy$xHistory 615 0$aAir warfare$xGovernment policy$xHistory 615 0$aAir power$xPhilosophy$xHistory 676 $a355.02/17097309045 700 $aKaplan$b Edward$01538922 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788012203321 996 $aTo kill nations$93789443 997 $aUNINA