LEADER 04506nam 2200733 450 001 9910788011503321 005 20230124191432.0 010 $a0-8014-5563-4 010 $a0-8014-5661-4 010 $a0-8014-5564-2 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801455643 035 $a(CKB)2670000000606934 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001461639 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11790313 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001461639 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11471988 035 $a(PQKB)11712188 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001516683 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138722 035 $a(OCoLC)1080549026 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse58312 035 $a(DE-B1597)478227 035 $a(OCoLC)905902789 035 $a(OCoLC)979576893 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801455643 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138722 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11040192 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL759714 035 $a(OCoLC)922998516 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000606934 100 $a20150417h20152015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWaging war, planning peace $eU.S. noncombat operations and major wars /$fAaron Rapport 210 1$aIthaca, [New York] ;$aLondon, [England] :$cCornell University Press,$d2015. 210 4$d©2015 215 $a1 online resource 225 0 $aCornell Studies in Security Affairs 300 $aIncludes index. 311 0 $a0-8014-5358-5 311 0 $a1-336-28428-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$tList of Abbreviations --$tIntroduction: Ambitious Aims and Meager Plans --$t1. Strategic Assessment and Noncombat Operations --$t2. The Occupation of Germany --$t3. "Phase IV" and the Invasion of Iraq --$t4. An Occupation That Never Was: Korea, 1950 - 1951 --$t5. State Building during Escalation in Vietnam --$tConclusion: Reviewing Theoretical and Policy Implications --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aAs the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In Waging War, Planning Peace, Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychology-specifically, construal level theory-can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future. In addition to preparations for "Phase IV" in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilian and military planners tend to think about near-term tasks in concrete terms, seriously assessing the feasibility of the means they plan to employ to secure valued ends. For tasks they perceive as further removed in time, they tend to focus more on the desirability of the overarching goals they are pursuing rather than the potential costs, risks, and challenges associated with the means necessary to achieve these goals. Construal level theory, Rapport contends, provides a coherent explanation of how a strategic disconnect can occur. It can also show postwar planners how to avoid such perilous missteps. 410 0$aCornell studies in security affairs. 606 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International)$2bisacsh 607 $aUnited States$xArmed Forces$xOperations other than war$xHistory$y20th century 607 $aUnited States$xArmed Forces$xOperations other than war$xHistory$y21st century 607 $aUnited States$xArmed Forces$xOperations other than war$vCase studies 607 $aUnited States$xHistory, Military$y20th century$vCase studies 607 $aUnited States$xHistory, Military$y21st century$vCase studies 615 7$aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International). 676 $a355.4 700 $aRapport$b Aaron$01538919 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788011503321 996 $aWaging war, planning peace$93789437 997 $aUNINA