LEADER 06744nam 2200673 450 001 9910787912203321 005 20200514202323.0 010 $a1-78225-419-6 010 $a1-5099-0705-X 010 $a1-4742-0164-4 010 $a1-78225-418-8 024 7 $a10.5040/9781474201643 035 $a(CKB)2670000000578542 035 $a(EBL)1873354 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001382501 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11994346 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001382501 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11459908 035 $a(PQKB)10316177 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1873354 035 $a(OCoLC)1154996503 035 $a(UtOrBLW)bpp09257423 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000578542 100 $a20141107h2014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 04$aThe constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints /$fedited by Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini, and Pierre Larouche 210 1$aOxford, United Kingdom ;$aPortland, Oregon :$cHart Publishing,$d2014. 215 $a1 online resource (446 p.) 225 1 $aModern studies in European law ;$vv. 47 300 $a"I am pleased to write the foreword to this volume, collecting the proceedings of a Conference held at Tilburg Law School, in the Netherlands on 30-31 May 2013 and organized by Federico Fabbrini, Maurice Adams and Pierre Larouche. This book explores the challenges of effectiveness and legitimacy produced by the constitutionalization of European budgetary rules and is highly recommended to anyone interested in European constitutional law, comparative fiscal federalism and the implications of the euro crisis."--Foreword. 311 $a1-84946-580-0 311 $a1-322-34310-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $gForward:$tFiscal capacity and constitutional reform in the EMU -- $rMiguel Poiares Maduro --$gIntroduction:$tThe constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints: effectiveness and legitimacy in comparative perspective -- $rMarice Adams, Federico Fabbrini and Pierre Larouche --$gPart 1. The new constitutional architecture of European Economic and Monetary Union --$tEconomic governance and the Euro crisis: constitutional architecture and constitutional implications -- $rPaul Craig --$tThe use of international law as a tool for enhancing governance in the Eurozone and its impact on EU institutional integrity -- $rAngelos Dimopoulos --$tDifferentiated economic governance and the reshaping of dominium law -- $rKenneth A Armstrong --$tEU fiscal governance and the effectiveness of its reform -- $rAlexandre de Streel --$tMaastricht revisited: economic constitutionalism, the ECB and the Bundesbank -- $rMarijn van der Sluis --$tThe independence of the ECB after the economic crisis -- $rStefania Baroncelli --$gPart 2. The constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints: comparative experiences --$t(Un)balanced budget rules in Europe and America -- $rPieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem --$tA legalization of financial constitutions in the EU? Reflections on the German, Spanish, Italian and French experiences -- $rGiacomo Delledonne --$tFiscal stability rules in central European constitutions -- $rMarek Antos? --$tCan constitutional rules, even if "golden," tame Greek public debt? -- $rLina Papadopoulou --$tMandatory balanced budget in Dutch legislation following examples abroad? -- $rMichal Diamant and Michiel van Emmerik --$tAn analysis of the method and efficacy of Ireland's incorporation of the fiscal compact -- $rRoderic O'Gorman --$gPart 3. Towards a genuine EMU: democracy, legitimacy and integration --$tDomestic courts, constitutional constraints and European democracy: what solution for the crisis? -- $rIngolf Pernice --$tNational parliaments' say on the new EU budgetary constraints: the case of Spain and Ireland -- $rSonia Piedrafita --$tWho got to adjudicate the EU's financial crisis and why? Judicial review and the legal instuments of the Eurozone -- $rSamo Bardutzky and Elaine Fahey --$tThe impact of stronger economic policy co-ordination on the European social dimension: issues of legitimacy -- $rFrancesco Costamagna --$tPower and legitimacy in the Eurozone: can integration and democracy be reconciled? -- $rPeter L Lindseth --$tFrom fiscal constraints to fiscal capacity: the future of EMU and its challenges -- $rFederico Fabbrini. 330 8 $aThe recently enacted Treaty on the Stability, Coordination and Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (generally referred to as the Fiscal Compact) has introduced a 'golden rule', which is a detailed obligation that government budgets be balanced. Moreover, it required the 25 members of the EU which signed the Treaty in March 2012, to incorporate this 'golden rule' within their national Constitutions. This requirement represents a major and unprecedented development, raising formidable challenges to the nature and legitimacy of national Constitutions as well as to the future of the European integration project. This book analyses the new constitutional architecture of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), examines in a comparative perspective the constitutionalization of budgetary rules in the legal systems of the Member States, and discusses the implications of these constitutional changes for the future of democracy and integration in the EU. By combining insights from law and economics, comparative institutional analysis and legal theory, the book offers a comprehensive survey of the constitutional incorporation of new fiscal and budgetary rules across Europe and a systematic normative discussion of the legitimacy issues at play. It thus contributes to a better understanding of the Euro-crisis, of the future of the EU, and the reforms needed towards a deeper and genuine EMU 410 0$aModern studies in European law ;$vv. 47. 606 $aBudget$xLaw and legislation$zEuropean Union countries$vCongresses 606 $2Financial services law & regulation 606 $aBudget$xLaw and legislation$2fast$3(OCoLC)fst00840363 607 $aEurope$zEuropean Union countries$2fast 608 $aConference proceedings.$2fast 615 0$aBudget$xLaw and legislation 615 7$aBudget$xLaw and legislation. 676 $a301 702 $aAdams$b Maurice$f1964- 702 $aFabbrini$b Federico$f1985- 702 $aLarouche$b Pierre 712 02$aUniversiteit van Tilburg.$bTilburg Law School. 801 0$bUtOrBLW 801 1$bUtOrBLW 801 2$bUkLoBP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910787912203321 996 $aThe constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints$93785067 997 $aUNINA