LEADER 03730nam 22007331 450 001 9910787800403321 005 20220223002243.0 010 $a0-231-53541-4 024 7 $a10.7312/ucko16426 035 $a(CKB)2670000000429913 035 $a(EBL)1321000 035 $a(OCoLC)861537997 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001001092 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11635273 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001001092 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10961550 035 $a(PQKB)10012359 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000812738 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1321000 035 $a(DE-B1597)459401 035 $a(OCoLC)859201448 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780231535410 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1321000 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10774430 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL562561 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000429913 100 $a20130322d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCounterinsurgency in crisis $eBritain and the challenges of modern warfare /$fDavid H. Ucko and Robert Egnell 210 1$aNew York :$cColumbia University Press,$d2013. 215 $a1 online resource (249 p.) 225 0 $aColumbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-231-16427-0 311 $a0-231-16426-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aUntangling the British counterinsurgency legacy -- The British in Basra: with heads held high into the abyss -- Act II: British counterinsurgency in Helmand -- "A horse and tank moment" -- Whither British counterinsurgency? 330 $aLong considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways. 410 0$aColumbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare. 606 $aCounterinsurgency$zGreat Britain 606 $aCounterinsurgency$zIraq$zBas?rah 606 $aCounterinsurgency$zAfghanistan$zHelmand 606 $aIraq War, 2003-2011$xParticipation, British 606 $aAfghan War, 2001-2021$xParticipation, British 607 $aGreat Britain$xHistory, Military$y21st century 615 0$aCounterinsurgency 615 0$aCounterinsurgency 615 0$aCounterinsurgency 615 0$aIraq War, 2003-2011$xParticipation, British. 615 0$aAfghan War, 2001-2021$xParticipation, British. 676 $a355/.02180941 700 $aUcko$b David H$01085151 701 $aEgnell$b Robert$01464575 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910787800403321 996 $aCounterinsurgency in crisis$93674278 997 $aUNINA