LEADER 04099nam 2200709 450 001 9910787708703321 005 20230814222705.0 010 $a1-5017-3123-8 010 $a0-8014-7073-0 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801470738 035 $a(CKB)2670000000543831 035 $a(OCoLC)870273151 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10900855 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001133486 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12444700 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001133486 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11158100 035 $a(PQKB)10214988 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001510193 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138616 035 $a(OCoLC)1080549314 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse58576 035 $a(DE-B1597)478481 035 $a(OCoLC)979748011 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801470738 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138616 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10900855 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL683593 035 $a(OCoLC)922998497 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000543831 100 $a20140814h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBrothers in arms $eChinese aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979 /$fAndrew Mertha 210 1$aIthaca, New York :$cCornell University Press,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (192 pages) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 0 $a1-322-52311-8 311 0 $a0-8014-5265-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tList of Illustrations --$tAcknowledgments --$tA Note on Transliteration --$t1. China's Relations with Democratic Kampuchea --$t2. The Khmer Rouge Bureaucracy --$t3. The Bureaucratic Structure of Chinese Overseas Assistance --$t4. DK Pushback and Military Institutional Integrity --$t5. The Failure of the Kampong Som Petroleum Refinery Project --$t6. China's Development of Democratic Kampuchean Trade --$t7. What Is Past Is Present --$tNotes --$tGlossary of Selected Terms --$tIndex 330 $aWhen the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia in 1975, they inherited a war-ravaged and internationally isolated country. Pol Pot's government espoused the rhetoric of self-reliance, but Democratic Kampuchea was utterly dependent on Chinese foreign aid and technical assistance to survive. Yet in a markedly asymmetrical relationship between a modernizing, nuclear power and a virtually premodern state, China was largely unable to use its power to influence Cambodian politics or policy. In Brothers in Arms, Andrew Mertha traces this surprising lack of influence to variations between the Chinese and Cambodian institutions that administered military aid, technology transfer, and international trade. Today, China's extensive engagement with the developing world suggests an inexorably rising China in the process of securing a degree of economic and political dominance that was unthinkable even a decade ago. Yet, China's experience with its first-ever client state suggests that the effectiveness of Chinese foreign aid, and influence that comes with it, is only as good as the institutions that manage the relationship. By focusing on the links between China and Democratic Kampuchea, Mertha peers into the "black box" of Chinese foreign aid to illustrate how domestic institutional fragmentation limits Beijing's ability to influence the countries that accept its assistance. 606 $aTechnical assistance, Chinese$zCambodia 606 $aMilitary assistance, Chinese$zCambodia 607 $aCambodia$xForeign relations$zChina 607 $aChina$xForeign relations$zCambodia 607 $aCambodia$xPolitics and government$y1975-1979 615 0$aTechnical assistance, Chinese 615 0$aMilitary assistance, Chinese 676 $a338.91/51059609047 700 $aMertha$b Andrew$f1965-$0627665 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910787708703321 996 $aBrothers in arms$93690944 997 $aUNINA