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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt
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200 10$aConstructing Cassandra$b[electronic resource] $ereframing intelligence failure at the CIA, 1947-2001 /$fMilo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
210   $aStanford, Calif. $cStanford University Press$d2013
215   $a1 online resource (375 pages)
300   $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
311 0 $a0-8047-9336-0 
311 0 $a0-8047-8580-5 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $tFront matter --$tCONTENTS --$tPREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --$tABBREVIATIONS --$tINTRODUCTION --$t1. THE WORK OF INTELLIGENCE --$t2. HOW THE CIA IS MADE --$t3. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION --$t4. THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR --$t5. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS --$t6. THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 --$t7. THE CIA AND THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE --$tNOTES --$tBIBLIOGRAPHY --$tINDEX
330   $aConstructing Cassandra analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks?surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon. To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA's intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises.
606   $aIntelligence service$zUnited States$xHistory
615  0$aIntelligence service$xHistory.
676   $a327.1273009/045
700   $aJones$b Milo$f1967-$01571971
701   $aSilberzahn$b Philippe$01571972
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910787562703321
996   $aConstructing Cassandra$93846552
997   $aUNINA