LEADER 03928nam 2200589Ia 450 001 9910786965703321 005 20230803030243.0 010 $a0-674-07447-5 010 $a0-674-07445-9 024 7 $a10.4159/harvard.9780674074453 035 $a(CKB)2670000000367947 035 $a(EBL)3301305 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000886320 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11539641 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000886320 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10817331 035 $a(PQKB)10082019 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3301305 035 $a(DE-B1597)209749 035 $a(OCoLC)843880808 035 $a(OCoLC)979967844 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674074453 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3301305 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10713632 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000367947 100 $a20121114d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn#---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLong wars and the constitution$b[electronic resource] /$fStephen M. Griffin 210 $aCambridge, Massachusetts $cHarvard University Press$d2013 215 $a1 online resource (376 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-674-05828-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tList of Acronyms --$tIntroduction --$t1. War Powers and Constitutional Change --$t2. Truman and the Post-1945 Constitutional Order --$t3. War and the National Security State --$t4. Vietnam and Watergate --$t5. The Constitutional Order in the Post-Vietnam Era --$t6. The 9/11 Wars and the Presidency --$t7. A New Constitutional Order? --$tAppendix: Executive Branch War Powers Opinions since 1950 --$tNotes --$tAcknowledgments --$tIndex 330 $aIn a wide-ranging constitutional history of presidential war decisions from 1945 to the present, Stephen M. Griffin rethinks the long-running debate over the "imperial presidency" and concludes that the eighteenth-century Constitution is inadequate to the challenges of a post-9/11 world. The Constitution requires the consent of Congress before the United States can go to war. Truman's decision to fight in Korea without gaining that consent was unconstitutional, says Griffin, but the acquiescence of Congress and the American people created a precedent for presidents to claim autonomy in this arena ever since. The unthinking extension of presidential leadership in foreign affairs to a point where presidents unilaterally decide when to go to war, Griffin argues, has destabilized our constitutional order and deranged our foreign policy. Long Wars and the Constitution demonstrates the unexpected connections between presidential war power and the constitutional crises that have plagued American politics. Contemporary presidents are caught in a dilemma. On the one hand are the responsibilities handed over to them by a dangerous world, and on the other is an incapacity for sound decision making in the absence of interbranch deliberation. President Obama's continuation of many Bush administration policies in the long war against terrorism is only the latest in a chain of difficulties resulting from the imbalances introduced by the post-1945 constitutional order. Griffin argues for beginning a cycle of accountability in which Congress would play a meaningful role in decisions for war, while recognizing the realities of twenty-first century diplomacy. 606 $aWar and emergency powers$zUnited States 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1945-1989 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1989- 615 0$aWar and emergency powers 676 $a342.73/0412 700 $aGriffin$b Stephen M.$f1957-$01464699 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910786965703321 996 $aLong wars and the constitution$93773857 997 $aUNINA