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100   $a20140528h20142014  uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcnu||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aIndispensable and other myths $ewhy the CEO pay experiment failed and how to fix it /$fMichael Dorff
210  1$aBerkeley, California ;$aLos Angeles, California ;$aLondon :$cUniversity of California Press,$d2014.
210  4$d©2014
215   $a1 online resource (327 p.)
300   $aIncludes index.
311   $a0-520-28101-2 
327   $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$t1. Introduction --$t2. The Puzzles of CEO Compensation --$t3. The Corporate Personality Myth --$t4. Market Mythology --$t5. Incentives Mythology --$t6. Performance Pay Mythology --$t7. Causation Mythology --$t8. Predictability Mythology --$t9. Alignment Mythology --$t10. Moving Forward --$tNotes --$tIndex
330   $aProdded by economists in the 1970's, corporate directors began adding stock options and bonuses to the already-generous salaries of CEO's with hopes of boosting their companies' fortunes. Guided by largely unproven assumptions, this trend continues today. So what are companies getting in return for all the extra money? Not much, according to the empirical data. In Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed and How to Fix It, Michael Dorff explores the consequences of this development. He shows how performance pay has not demonstrably improved corporate performance and offers studies showing that performance pay cannot improve performance on the kind of tasks companies ask of their CEO's. Moreover, CEO's of large established companies do not typically have much impact on their companies' results. In this eye-opening exposé, Dorff argues that companies should give up on the decades-long experiment to mold compensation into a corporate governance tool and maps out a rationale for returning to the era of guaranteed salaries.
606   $aChief executive officers$xSalaries, etc
606   $aExecutives$xSalaries, etc$zUnited States
606   $aCompensation management$zUnited States
610   $aamerican business.
610   $aamerican economy.
610   $abehavioral theory.
610   $abig business.
610   $aboard members.
610   $abosses.
610   $abusiness.
610   $acapitalism.
610   $aceos.
610   $achief executive officer.
610   $acompensation.
610   $acorporate culture.
610   $acorporate directors.
610   $acorporate governance tools.
610   $acorporate performance.
610   $acorporations.
610   $aeconomists.
610   $aeconomy.
610   $aera of guaranteed salaries.
610   $aexecutive pay.
610   $ahuman resource professionals.
610   $alarge salaries.
610   $aleadership.
610   $amotivation.
610   $aperformance pay.
610   $aproject management.
610   $astock options.
615  0$aChief executive officers$xSalaries, etc.
615  0$aExecutives$xSalaries, etc.
615  0$aCompensation management
676   $a658.4/072
700   $aDorff$b Michael$f1970-$01509435
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910786820903321
996   $aIndispensable and other myths$93741333
997   $aUNINA