LEADER 03769nam 22007092 450 001 9910786216603321 005 20151005020622.0 010 $a1-139-61123-2 010 $a1-107-23808-0 010 $a1-139-62239-0 010 $a1-139-60939-4 010 $a1-139-61309-X 010 $a1-139-61681-1 010 $a1-139-62611-6 010 $a1-139-50676-5 035 $a(CKB)2670000000344003 035 $a(EBL)1099952 035 $a(OCoLC)843191690 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000857604 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11437174 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000857604 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10867888 035 $a(PQKB)10148094 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781139506762 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1099952 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1099952 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10695287 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL494753 035 $a(PPN)180973185 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000344003 100 $a20120515d2013|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics $ethe myth of neutrality /$fChristopher Adolph$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2013. 215 $a1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aCambridge studies in comparative politics 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-56709-2 311 $a1-107-03261-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aAgents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- Career theories of monetary policy -- Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- Careers and the monetary policy process: three mechanism tests -- Careers and inflation in developing countries -- How central bankers use their independence -- Partisan governments, labor unions and monetary policy -- The politics of central banker appointment -- The politics of central banker tenure -- Conclusion: the dilemma of discretion. 330 $aMost studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks. 410 0$aCambridge studies in comparative politics. 517 3 $aBankers, Bureaucrats, & Central Bank Politics 606 $aMonetary policy 606 $aBanks and banking, Central$xPolitical aspects 606 $aBureaucracy 615 0$aMonetary policy. 615 0$aBanks and banking, Central$xPolitical aspects. 615 0$aBureaucracy. 676 $a332.1/1 700 $aAdolph$b Christopher$f1976-$01533629 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910786216603321 996 $aBankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics$93780709 997 $aUNINA