LEADER 03905nam 2200685 a 450 001 9910786200703321 005 20230803024806.0 010 $a0-8014-6574-5 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801465741 035 $a(CKB)2670000000275559 035 $a(EBL)3138380 035 $a(OCoLC)922998260 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000757363 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11450842 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000757363 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10759170 035 $a(PQKB)10628181 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001500244 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138380 035 $a(OCoLC)814372607 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse28782 035 $a(DE-B1597)478405 035 $a(OCoLC)1013940639 035 $a(OCoLC)979684341 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801465741 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138380 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10612408 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL681630 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000275559 100 $a20120511d2013 fy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aZion's dilemmas $ehow Israel makes national security policy /$fCharles D. Freilich 210 $aIthaca $cCornell University Press$d2013 215 $a1 online resource (336 p.) 225 0 $aCornell Studies in Security Affairs 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 1 $a1-322-50348-6 311 1 $a0-8014-5104-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $apt. I. The setting -- pt. II. The case studies -- pt. III. Final thoughts. 330 $aIn Zion's Dilemmas, a former deputy national security adviser to the State of Israel details the history and, in many cases, the chronic inadequacies in the making of Israeli national security policy. Chuck Freilich identifies profound, ongoing problems that he ascribes to a series of factors: a hostile and highly volatile regional environment, Israel's proportional representation electoral system, and structural peculiarities of the Israeli government and bureaucracy. Freilich uses his insider understanding and substantial archival and interview research to describe how Israel has made strategic decisions and to present a first of its kind model of national security decision-making in Israel. He analyzes the major events of the last thirty years, from Camp David I to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, through Camp David II, the Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2005, and the second Lebanon war of 2006.In these and other cases he identifies opportunities forgone, failures that resulted from a flawed decision-making process, and the entanglement of Israeli leaders in an inconsistent, highly politicized, and sometimes improvisational planning process. The cabinet is dysfunctional and Israel does not have an effective statutory forum for its decision-making-most of which is thus conducted in informal settings. In many cases policy objectives and options are poorly formulated. For all these problems, however, the Israeli decision-making process does have some strengths, among them the ability to make rapid and flexible responses, generally pragmatic decision-making, effective planning within the defense establishment, and the skills and motivation of those involved. Freilich concludes with cogent and timely recommendations for reform. 410 0$aCornell Studies in Security Affairs 606 $aNational security$zIsrael$xDecision making 607 $aIsrael$xPolitics and government 607 $aIsrael$xMilitary policy 607 $aIsrael$xForeign relations 615 0$aNational security$xDecision making. 676 $a355/.03355694 700 $aFreilich$b Charles D$g(Charles David)$01533260 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910786200703321 996 $aZion's dilemmas$93780096 997 $aUNINA