LEADER 05845nam 22006731 450 001 9910453767003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-19-989039-0 035 $a(CKB)2550000001159466 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH25858286 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001041755 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12462171 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001041755 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11050005 035 $a(PQKB)10953147 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1561210 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1561210 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10796871 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL542670 035 $a(OCoLC)862745777 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001159466 100 $a20121116h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhen soldiers fall $ehow Americans have confronted combat losses from World War I to Afghanistan /$fSteven Casey 210 1$aOxford ;$aNew York :$cOxford University Press,$d[2014] 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (336 pages )$cillustrations 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-19-989038-2 311 $a1-306-11419-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCensorship and the first casualty controversy: World War I, 1917-1918 -- Bad news in the "good war": World War II, 1941-1943 -- The price of victory: World War II, 1944-1945 -- Partisanship and the police action: the Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Vietnam: the escalating war, 1961-1968 -- Vietnam: de-escalation and defeat, 1969-1989 -- Gulf Wars: Iraq and Afghanistan, 1990-2011. 330 8 $aWhen Soldiers Fall traces the history of American combat losses and the ways in which the government has reported casualties from WWI to the current War on Terror.$bThe extent to which combat casualties influence the public's support for war is one of the most frequently and fiercely debated subjects in current American life and has cast an enormous shadow over both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. The common assumption, based largely on U.S. experience in past wars, is that the public is in some way casualty averse or casualty shy, and that as losses increase its support for a war will inexorably decline. Yet this assumption has beenadopted as conventional wisdom without any awareness of one of the most important dimensions of the issue: how has the public become aware of the casualties sustained during particular wars? To what extent has the government tried to manipulate or massage the figures? When and why have these officialfigures been challenged by opportunistic political opponents or aggressive scoop-seeking reporters? As Steven Casey demonstrates, at key moments in most wars what the public actually receives is not straightforward and accurate casualty totals, but an enormous amount of noise based on a mixture of suppression, suspicion, and speculation. This book aims to correct this gap in information by showing precise what casualty figures the government announced during its various wars, the timing of these announcements, and any spin officials may have placed upon these, using a range of hithertountapped primary documents. Among the nuggets he has uncovered is that during World War I the media depended on Axis figures and that the Army and Navy did not announce casualty figures for an entire year during World War II. Organized chronologically, the book addresses the two world wars, the limitedwars in Korea and Vietnam, and the recent conflicts that are part of the War on Terror. Using sources such as the private military command papers of Generals Patton, MacArthur, and Westmoreland, and previously unopened New York Times archives, it offers the first analysis of how the U.S. government has publicized combat casualties during these wars, and how these official announcements have been debated and disputed by other voices in the polity. Casey discusses factors such as changes ofpresidential administration, the improvement of technology, the sending of war correspondents to cover multiple conflicts, and the increasing ability to identify bodies. Casey recreates the complicated controversies that have surrounded key battles, and in doing so challenges the simplicity of theoft-repeated conventional wisdom that " By integrating military and political history, he presents a totally new interpretation of U.S. domestic propaganda since 1917, filling a major gap left by a spate of recent books. Finally, it provides a fresh and engaging new perspective on some of the biggest battles in recent American history, including the Meuse-Argonne, D-Day, the Battle of the Bulge, China's intervention in the Korean War, the TetOffensive, and the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.This book should speak to the military, political, and media history markets, and it should also reach a wider audience that is debating contemporary casualty figures. 606 $aCasualty aversion (Military science)$zUnited States 606 $aPublic opinion$zUnited States 606 $aMass media and war$zUnited States 606 $aWar casualties$zUnited States$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aWar casualties$zUnited States$xHistory$y21st century 606 $aWar casualties$zUnited States$xPublic opinion 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aCasualty aversion (Military science) 615 0$aPublic opinion 615 0$aMass media and war 615 0$aWar casualties$xHistory 615 0$aWar casualties$xHistory 615 0$aWar casualties$xPublic opinion. 676 $a355.4/22 700 $aCasey$b Steven$0475870 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910453767003321 996 $aWhen soldiers fall$92223777 997 $aUNINA LEADER 00905nam a2200241 i 4500 001 991001131299707536 008 110330s2010 it 000 0 ita d 020 $a9788806201326 035 $ab1396544x-39ule_inst 040 $aSet. Economia - SEMS$bita 082 0 $a955.06 100 1 $aAxworthy, Michael $0474614 245 10$aBreve storia dell'Iran :$bdalle origini ai nostri giorni /$cMichael Axworthy 260 $aTorino :$bEinaudi,$c2010 300 $aX, 343 p. :$bill. ;$c21 cm 440 0$aPiccola biblioteca Einaudi.$pMappe ;$v19 651 4$aIran$xStoria 907 $a.b1396544x$b16-05-11$c30-03-11 912 $a991001131299707536 945 $aLE025 ECO 955 AXW01.01$g1$i2025000254701$lle025$nProf. Mastrolia$o-$pE24.00$q-$rl$s- $t0$u3$v2$w3$x0$y.i15267015$z16-05-11 996 $aBreve storia dell'Iran$9245884 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale025$b - - $cm$da $e-$fita$git $h0$i0 LEADER 05274nam 2200649 a 450 001 9910785920203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-283-70023-9 010 $a1-118-22186-9 035 $a(CKB)2670000000271657 035 $a(EBL)821760 035 $a(OCoLC)817921085 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000754629 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11424361 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000754629 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10726545 035 $a(PQKB)10253589 035 $a(DLC) 2012029215 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL821760 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10615067 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL401273 035 $a(CaSebORM)9781118235645 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC821760 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000271657 100 $a20120718d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFraming decisions$b[electronic resource] $edecision making that accounts for irrationality, people, and constraints /$fJ. Davidson Frame 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aSan Francisco $cJossey-Bass$d2013 215 $a1 online resource (305 p.) 225 0$aJossey-Bass business & management series 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-118-23564-9 311 $a1-118-01489-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aTitle page; Copyright page; Contents; List of Figures; Preface; 1: An Evolving Decision-Making Paradigm; The Traditional Paradigm; The Real World; Rethinking Decision Making; Social Context; Constraints; The Cognitive Challenge; Adjusting to the New Paradigm; Conclusion: It Isn't Easy Getting It Right; 2: Decisions and Decision Making; Different Perspectives on Decision making; Decision Science; Economics; Public Policy; Social Psychology; Psychology; Law: Adjudication; Neuroscience; Philosophy; Rational, Irrational, Nonrational Decisions; Dealing with Unknowns; Handling Risk 327 $aHandling UncertaintyWorking with Risk and Uncertainty; 3: The Social Context of Decision Making; The Social Context; Stakeholders in Decision Making; The Community and Social Forces; The Social Space of Decision making; Allison's Multiple Perspectives on Decision making; The Link Between Stakeholder and Decision-Maker; The Implementation Challenge; Accommodating External Forces; Conclusion; 4: The Organizational Dimension; Organizational Structure; Chain-of-Command Structure; Self-Directed Team Structure; Decision-Making Impact of Organizational Architecture; Organizational Process 327 $aPeople in OrganizationsOrganizational Culture; Athenian Versus Spartan Outlooks; Risk-Taking Versus Risk-Avoiding Outlooks; Innovative Versus Legacy Outlooks; Conclusion; 5: The Moral Dimension; Broad Categories of Moral Failings; Deceit; Negligence; Illegal Behavior; Moral Hazard; Principal-Agent Dilemma; Morality, Ethics, and Legality: They Are Different; Last Word; 6: People as Decision-Makers; Factors That Affect How Individuals Make Decisions; Personality; Creative Capacity; Intelligence; Competence and Capability; Cognitive State; Psychological State 327 $aPersonality Factors of Particular Importance to Decision MakingA Unique Perspective on Personality and Decision making: Elliott Jaques, Human Capability, and Time Span of Discretion; Conclusion; 7: The Wisdom-and Foolishness-of Crowds; Individual Versus Group Decision-Participation Spectrum; Autocrat; Consultative Leader; Primus Inter Pares; Council; Self-Directed Work Unit; Community; Making Decisions in Groups; Degrees of Consensus; Defining Consensus; Nature of Consensus; Decision Rules; Reaching a Decision; Setting; Steps Toward Making a Decision in Groups 327 $aThe Wisdom and Foolishness of CrowdsIndividuals Versus Groups; The Wisdom of Crowds Perspective; Distributed Collaboration; Honeybee Decision Making; 8: The Biology of Decision Making; Brain Basics; The Lazy Brain; Template Solutions; Resistance to Change; Elusive Reality; Visual Illusions: What You See Isn't What You Get; Examples of Visual Illusions; Filling in the Blanks with Established Images; Filling in the Blanks for Events That Have Not Yet Happened; When Things Aren't Quite Aligned; Compensating for Environmental Conditions: Example 1 327 $aCompensating for Environmental Conditions: Example 2 330 $a The economic crisis of 2008-2009 was a transformational event: it demonstrated that smart people aren't as smart as they and the public think. The crisis arose because a lot of highly educated people in high-impact positions- political power brokers, business leaders, and large segments of the general public-made a lot of bad decisions despite unprecedented access to data, highly sophisticated decision support systems, methodological advances in the decision sciences, and guidance from highly experienced experts. How could we get things so wrong? The answer, 606 $aDecision making 615 0$aDecision making. 676 $a153.8/3 700 $aFrame$b J. Davidson$01576600 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910785920203321 996 $aFraming decisions$93854480 997 $aUNINA