LEADER 05274nam 2200649 a 450 001 9910785920203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-283-70023-9 010 $a1-118-22186-9 035 $a(CKB)2670000000271657 035 $a(EBL)821760 035 $a(OCoLC)817921085 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000754629 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11424361 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000754629 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10726545 035 $a(PQKB)10253589 035 $a(DLC) 2012029215 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL821760 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10615067 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL401273 035 $a(CaSebORM)9781118235645 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC821760 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000271657 100 $a20120718d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFraming decisions$b[electronic resource] $edecision making that accounts for irrationality, people, and constraints /$fJ. Davidson Frame 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aSan Francisco $cJossey-Bass$d2013 215 $a1 online resource (305 p.) 225 0$aJossey-Bass business & management series 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-118-23564-9 311 $a1-118-01489-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aTitle page; Copyright page; Contents; List of Figures; Preface; 1: An Evolving Decision-Making Paradigm; The Traditional Paradigm; The Real World; Rethinking Decision Making; Social Context; Constraints; The Cognitive Challenge; Adjusting to the New Paradigm; Conclusion: It Isn't Easy Getting It Right; 2: Decisions and Decision Making; Different Perspectives on Decision making; Decision Science; Economics; Public Policy; Social Psychology; Psychology; Law: Adjudication; Neuroscience; Philosophy; Rational, Irrational, Nonrational Decisions; Dealing with Unknowns; Handling Risk 327 $aHandling UncertaintyWorking with Risk and Uncertainty; 3: The Social Context of Decision Making; The Social Context; Stakeholders in Decision Making; The Community and Social Forces; The Social Space of Decision making; Allison's Multiple Perspectives on Decision making; The Link Between Stakeholder and Decision-Maker; The Implementation Challenge; Accommodating External Forces; Conclusion; 4: The Organizational Dimension; Organizational Structure; Chain-of-Command Structure; Self-Directed Team Structure; Decision-Making Impact of Organizational Architecture; Organizational Process 327 $aPeople in OrganizationsOrganizational Culture; Athenian Versus Spartan Outlooks; Risk-Taking Versus Risk-Avoiding Outlooks; Innovative Versus Legacy Outlooks; Conclusion; 5: The Moral Dimension; Broad Categories of Moral Failings; Deceit; Negligence; Illegal Behavior; Moral Hazard; Principal-Agent Dilemma; Morality, Ethics, and Legality: They Are Different; Last Word; 6: People as Decision-Makers; Factors That Affect How Individuals Make Decisions; Personality; Creative Capacity; Intelligence; Competence and Capability; Cognitive State; Psychological State 327 $aPersonality Factors of Particular Importance to Decision MakingA Unique Perspective on Personality and Decision making: Elliott Jaques, Human Capability, and Time Span of Discretion; Conclusion; 7: The Wisdom-and Foolishness-of Crowds; Individual Versus Group Decision-Participation Spectrum; Autocrat; Consultative Leader; Primus Inter Pares; Council; Self-Directed Work Unit; Community; Making Decisions in Groups; Degrees of Consensus; Defining Consensus; Nature of Consensus; Decision Rules; Reaching a Decision; Setting; Steps Toward Making a Decision in Groups 327 $aThe Wisdom and Foolishness of CrowdsIndividuals Versus Groups; The Wisdom of Crowds Perspective; Distributed Collaboration; Honeybee Decision Making; 8: The Biology of Decision Making; Brain Basics; The Lazy Brain; Template Solutions; Resistance to Change; Elusive Reality; Visual Illusions: What You See Isn't What You Get; Examples of Visual Illusions; Filling in the Blanks with Established Images; Filling in the Blanks for Events That Have Not Yet Happened; When Things Aren't Quite Aligned; Compensating for Environmental Conditions: Example 1 327 $aCompensating for Environmental Conditions: Example 2 330 $a The economic crisis of 2008-2009 was a transformational event: it demonstrated that smart people aren't as smart as they and the public think. The crisis arose because a lot of highly educated people in high-impact positions- political power brokers, business leaders, and large segments of the general public-made a lot of bad decisions despite unprecedented access to data, highly sophisticated decision support systems, methodological advances in the decision sciences, and guidance from highly experienced experts. How could we get things so wrong? The answer, 606 $aDecision making 615 0$aDecision making. 676 $a153.8/3 700 $aFrame$b J. Davidson$01576600 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910785920203321 996 $aFraming decisions$93854480 997 $aUNINA