LEADER 03744nam 2200685 a 450 001 9910785536103321 005 20230725033857.0 010 $a1-283-58218-X 010 $a9786613894632 010 $a0-19-157178-4 035 $a(CKB)2670000000236990 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH24219703 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000736515 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12300289 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000736515 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10772908 035 $a(PQKB)10543669 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000370256 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11276428 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000370256 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10374278 035 $a(PQKB)11211624 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3054846 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000236990 100 $a20110615e20112009 fy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBeyond consequentialism$b[electronic resource] /$fby Paul Hurley 210 $aOxford $cOxford University Press$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (288 p.) 300 $aOriginally published: 2009. 311 $a0-19-969843-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 8 $aHurley sets out a radical challenge to consequentialism, the theory which might seem to be the default option in contemporary moral philosophy. There is an unresolved tension within the theory: if consequentialists are right about the content of morality, then morality cannot have the rational authority that even they take it to have.$bConsequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challenge consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to theauthoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to do what morality requires, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of moral standards. Hurley builds upon this challenge to argue that the consequentialist case for grounding the impartialevaluation of actions in the impartial evaluation of outcomes is built upon a set of subtle and mutually reinforcing mistakes. Through exposing these mistakes and misappropriations, he undermines consequentialist arguments against alternative approaches that recognize a conception of impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of actions which is distinct from the impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of outcomes. A moral theory that recognizes a fundamental role for such a distinctconception of impartiality can account for the rational authority of moral standards, but does so, Hurley argues, by taking morality beyond consequentialism in both its standard and non-standard forms. 606 $aConsequentialism (Ethics) 606 $aPragmatism 606 $aPhilosophy$2ukslc 606 $aPhilosophy$2HILCC 606 $aPhilosophy & Religion$2HILCC 606 $aEthics$2HILCC 608 $aElectronic books.$2lcsh 615 0$aConsequentialism (Ethics) 615 0$aPragmatism. 615 7$aPhilosophy. 615 7$aPhilosophy 615 7$aPhilosophy & Religion 615 7$aEthics 676 $a171.5 700 $aHurley$b Paul$g(Paul E.)$01523980 801 0$bStDuBDS 801 1$bStDuBDS 801 2$bStDuBDSZ 801 2$bUkPrAHLS 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910785536103321 996 $aBeyond consequentialism$93764359 997 $aUNINA