LEADER 04099nam 2200613Ia 450 001 9910785396503321 005 20230725025208.0 010 $a0-8047-7516-8 024 7 $a10.1515/9780804775168 035 $a(CKB)2670000000052073 035 $a(EBL)589553 035 $a(OCoLC)670411775 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000457200 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11328438 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000457200 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10429429 035 $a(PQKB)10099104 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC589553 035 $a(DE-B1597)563995 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780804775168 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL589553 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10420310 035 $a(OCoLC)1178768870 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000052073 100 $a20100317d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBetween threats and war $eU.S. discrete military operations in the post-Cold War world /$fMicah Zenko 210 $aStanford, Ca $cStanford Security Series$d2010 215 $a1 online resource (xii, 228 pages) $cillustrations, maps 300 $a"A Council on Foreign Relations book." 311 1 $a0-8047-7190-1 311 1 $a0-8047-7191-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tBetween Threats and War --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$tAcronyms Used in This Book --$t1. Introduction --$t2. Political Uses of Force and the Civilian-Military Split --$t3. Iraqi No-Fly Zones: 1991?2003 --$t4. Sudan and Afghanistan: August 20, 1998 --$t5. Yemen: November 3, 2002 --$t6. Khurmal, Iraq: Summer 2002 --$t7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations --$tAppendix I. Coding Cases and Descriptions: U.S. Discrete Military Operations, 1991 to June 1, 2009 --$tAppendix II. Non-Uses of U.S. Discrete Military Operations, 1991 to June 1, 2009 --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aWhen confronted with a persistent foreign policy problem that threatens U.S. interests, and that cannot be adequately addressed through economic or political pressure, American policymakers and opinion formers have increasingly resorted to recommending the use of limited military force: that is, enough force to attempt to resolve the problem while minimizing U.S. military deaths, local civilian casualties, and collateral damage. These recommendations have ranged from the bizarre?such as a Predator missile strike to kill Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, or the assassination of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez?to the unwise?the preemptive bombing of North Korean ballistic missile sites?to the demonstrably practical?air raids into Bosnia and Somalia, and drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan. However, even though they have been a regular feature of America's uses of military force through four successive administrations, the efficacy of these "Discrete Military Operations" (DMOs) remains largely unanalyzed, leaving unanswered the important question of whether or not they have succeeded in achieving their intended military and political objectives. In response, Micah Zenko examines the thirty-six DMOs undertaken by the US over the past 20 years, in order to discern why they were used, if they achieved their objectives, and what determined their success or failure. In the process, he both evaluates U.S. policy choices and recommends ways in which limited military force can be better used in the future. The insights and recommendations made by Zenko will be increasingly relevant to making decisions and predictions about the development of American grand strategy and future military policy. 606 $aDiplomacy 606 $aLimited war 607 $aUnited States$xMilitary policy 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1989- 615 0$aDiplomacy. 615 0$aLimited war. 676 $a355.4/77309049 700 $aZenko$b Micah$01484360 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910785396503321 996 $aBetween threats and war$93702966 997 $aUNINA