LEADER 04404oam 2200673Ia 450 001 9910785008203321 005 20190503073354.0 010 $a0-262-31010-4 010 $a1-282-73699-X 010 $a9786612736995 010 $a0-262-27553-8 024 8 $a9786612736995 035 $a(CKB)2670000000038553 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000423823 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11929701 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000423823 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10469202 035 $a(PQKB)10678321 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000130727 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3339155 035 $a(OCoLC)648759758$z(OCoLC)668397797$z(OCoLC)729017704$z(OCoLC)748605876$z(OCoLC)764542486$z(OCoLC)768694860$z(OCoLC)798210816$z(OCoLC)816576705$z(OCoLC)961557669$z(OCoLC)962619832$z(OCoLC)988407443$z(OCoLC)992024657$z(OCoLC)1037938336$z(OCoLC)1038571324$z(OCoLC)1045528202$z(OCoLC)1055337299$z(OCoLC)1061075813$z(OCoLC)1065105219$z(OCoLC)1081206779 035 $a(OCoLC-P)648759758 035 $a(MaCbMITP)8365 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3339155 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10402811 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL273699 035 $a(OCoLC)648759758 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000038553 100 $a20100719d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 04$aThe natural resources trap $eprivate investment without public commitment /$fedited by William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cMIT Press$dİ2010 215 $a1 online resource (xiv, 519 p.) $cill 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-262-01379-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 330 $a"This book is important and timely, bringing together some of the world's leading economists. The theory chapters provide new insights and apply new developments in contract theory to the problems of natural resources and credible host country policies. The case studies provide up-to-date illustrations of the difficulties and development of host country policy in Latin America and the UK." Roderick Duncan, Charles Sturt University, Australia "This book is likely to become a standard reference in the area of natural resources and credible host country policies-coming, as it does, with a solid grounding in modern economic theory." Tim Worrall, University of Manchester Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sectoris called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework? In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this guestion in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world. --Book Jacket. 606 $aNatural resources$xGovernment policy 606 $aNatural resources$xLaw and legislation 606 $aInvestments, Foreign 606 $aPublic-private sector cooperation 610 $aECONOMICS/Environmental Economics 615 0$aNatural resources$xGovernment policy. 615 0$aNatural resources$xLaw and legislation. 615 0$aInvestments, Foreign. 615 0$aPublic-private sector cooperation. 676 $a333.7 701 $aHogan$b William W$0247734 701 $aSturzenegger$b Federico$0295521 801 0$bOCoLC-P 801 1$bOCoLC-P 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910785008203321 996 $aThe natural resources trap$93781667 997 $aUNINA