LEADER 03283nam  22006854a 450 
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005 20200520144314.0
010   $a1-281-17940-X
010   $a9786611179403
010   $a3-540-73016-8
024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-540-73016-3
035   $a(CKB)1000000000406995
035   $a(EBL)337224
035   $a(OCoLC)233973287
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000218322
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)11198626
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000218322
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10212977
035   $a(PQKB)10075794
035   $a(DE-He213)978-3-540-73016-3
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC337224
035   $a(Au-PeEL)EBL337224
035   $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10217388
035   $a(CaONFJC)MIL117940
035   $a(PPN)123742277
035   $a(EXLCZ)991000000000406995
100   $a20070926d2008      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aPartner choice and cooperation in networks$b[electronic resource] $etheory and experimental evidence /$fAljaz Ule
205   $a1st ed. 2008.
210   $aBerlin $cSpringer$d2008
215   $a1 online resource (212 p.)
225 1 $aLecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ;$v598
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a3-540-73015-X 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aMotivation and Outline -- Basic Concepts of the Theories of Games, Networks and Markov Chains -- The Network Dilemma Game -- Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Network Dilemma Games -- Exclusion and Cooperation in Experiments -- Dynamics of Partner Choice and Cooperation.
330   $aCooperation is beneficial but may be hard to achieve in situations where the selfish interests of individuals conflict with their common goal, such as in sharing of goods, help, knowledge or information, in trade and pollution negotiations, and in exploitation of common resources. The standard models of such "social dilemmas" assume that the individuals are obliged to participate in the dilemma. These models fail to capture an important element of human interaction: that people are in general free to select their interaction partners. In this book a social dilemma with partner selection is introduced and studied with the methods of formal game theory, experimental economics and computer simulations. It allows exploration of simultaneous dynamics of the network structure and cooperative behavior on this structure. The results of this study show that partner choice strongly facilitates cooperation and leads to networks where free-riders are likely to be excluded.
410  0$aLecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ;$v598.
606   $aCooperation
606   $aSocial networks
606   $aCooperativeness
606   $aSocial conflict
615  0$aCooperation.
615  0$aSocial networks.
615  0$aCooperativeness.
615  0$aSocial conflict.
676   $a302.14
700   $aUle$b Aljaz?$0758990
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910784991503321
996   $aPartner choice and cooperation in networks$91533743
997   $aUNINA