LEADER 03373nam 22006612 450 001 9910783013703321 005 20151005020621.0 010 $a1-107-12044-6 010 $a1-280-42983-6 010 $a9786610429837 010 $a0-511-17276-1 010 $a0-511-01674-3 010 $a0-511-15162-4 010 $a0-511-31077-3 010 $a0-511-49178-6 010 $a0-511-04609-X 035 $a(CKB)1000000000005988 035 $a(EBL)201712 035 $a(OCoLC)475915672 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000219679 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11220323 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000219679 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10229648 035 $a(PQKB)10518488 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511491788 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL201712 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr2000885 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL42983 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC201712 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000005988 100 $a20090302d2000|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aPerfect deterrence /$fFrank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2000. 215 $a1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aCambridge studies in international relations ;$v72 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a0-521-78713-0 311 $a0-521-78174-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aClassical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory. 330 $aAn important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject. 410 0$aCambridge studies in international relations ;$v72. 606 $aDeterrence (Strategy) 615 0$aDeterrence (Strategy) 676 $a355.02/17 700 $aZagare$b Frank C.$0102372 702 $aKilgour$b D. Marc 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910783013703321 996 $aPerfect deterrence$93823176 997 $aUNINA LEADER 01341nam0 22003613i 450 001 PUV0824337 005 20251003044315.0 010 $a084932288X 100 $a20080728d2001 ||||0itac50 ba 101 | $aeng 102 $aus 181 1$6z01$ai $bxxxe 182 1$6z01$an 200 1 $aMulti-agent robotic systems$fJiming Liu, Jianbing Wu 210 $aBoca Raton [etc.] $cCRC$dc2001 215 $aXVII, 304 p.$cill.$d25 cm. 225 | $aInternational series on computational intelligence 410 0$1001UAN0006529$12001 $aInternational series on computational intelligence 606 $aAutomi$2FIR$3CFIC015972$9E 676 $a629.8$9INGEGNERIA DEI CONTROLLI AUTOMATICI$v14 676 $a629.892$9CONTROLLO AUTOMATICO MEDIANTE ELABORATORE. ROBOT$v22 696 $aRobot 699 $aAutomi$yRobot 700 1$aLiu$b, Jiming$f <1962- >$3RMSV048775$4070$0771474 701 1$aWu$b, Jianbing$3PUVV311943$4070$0771475 801 3$aIT$bIT-000000$c20080728 850 $aIT-BN0095 901 $bNAP 01$cSALA DING $n$ 912 $aPUV0824337 950 0$aBiblioteca Centralizzata di Ateneo$c1 v.$d 01SALA DING 629.8 LIU.mu$e 0102 0000056525 VMA A4 1 v.$fY $h20070404$i20070404 977 $a 01 996 $aMulti-agent robotic systems$91574298 997 $aUNISANNIO