LEADER 04181nam 2200685 a 450 001 9910782894403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-79638-0 010 $a9786612796388 024 7 $a10.7312/arat14302 035 $a(CKB)1000000000717457 035 $a(EBL)908431 035 $a(OCoLC)818855932 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000434854 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12192042 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000434854 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10404536 035 $a(PQKB)10519705 035 $a(DE-B1597)458607 035 $a(OCoLC)696796394 035 $a(OCoLC)979574682 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780231512435 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL908431 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10419532 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL279638 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC908431 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000717457 100 $a20080710d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aConstitution making under occupation$b[electronic resource] $ethe politics of imposed revolution in Iraq /$fAndrew Arato 210 $aNew York $cColumbia University Press$dc2009 215 $a1 online resource (377 p.) 225 1 $aColumbia studies in political thought / political history 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-231-14302-8 311 $a0-231-51243-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aThe externally imposed revolution and its destruction of the Iraqi State -- Postsovereign constitution making : the new paradigm (and Iraq) -- Sistani versus Bremer : the emergence of the two-stage model in Iraq -- Imposition and bargaining in the making of the interim constitution -- The making of the "permanent" constitution. 330 $aThe attempt in 2004 to draft an interim constitution in Iraq and the effort to enact a permanent one in 2005 were unintended outcomes of the American occupation, which first sought to impose a constitution by its agents. This two-stage constitution-making paradigm, implemented in a wholly unplanned move by the Iraqis and their American sponsors, formed a kind of compromise between the populist-democratic project of Shi'ite clerics and America's external interference. As long as it was used in a coherent and legitimate way, the method held promise. Unfortunately, the logic of external imposition and political exclusion compromised the negotiations. Andrew Arato is the first person to record this historic process and analyze its special problems. He compares the drafting of the Iraqi constitution to similar, externally imposed constitutional revolutions by the United States, especially in Japan and Germany, and identifies the political missteps that contributed to problems of learning and legitimacy. Instead of claiming that the right model of constitution making would have maintained stability in Iraq, Arato focuses on the fragile opportunity for democratization that was strengthened only slightly by the methods used to draft a constitution. Arato contends that this event would have benefited greatly from an overall framework of internationalization, and he argues that a better set of guidelines (rather than the obsolete Hague and Geneva regulations) should be followed in the future. With access to an extensive body of literature, Arato highlights the difficulty of exporting democracy to a country that opposes all such foreign designs and fundamentally disagrees on matters of political identity. 410 0$aColumbia studies in political thought/political history. 606 $aConstitutional law$zIraq 606 $aConstitutional history$zIraq 606 $aPostwar reconstruction$zIraq 607 $aIraq$xPolitics and government$y2003- 615 0$aConstitutional law 615 0$aConstitutional history 615 0$aPostwar reconstruction 676 $a342.567 700 $aArato$b Andrew$0122323 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910782894403321 996 $aConstitution making under occupation$93786864 997 $aUNINA