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101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aSelf and world$b[electronic resource] $efrom analytic philosophy to phenomenology /$fby Carleton B. Christensen
210   $aBerlin ;$aNew York $cWalter De Gruyter$dc2008
215   $a1 online resource (404 p.)
225 1 $aQuellen und Studien zur Philosophie,$x0344-8142 ;$vBd. 89
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a3-11-020401-0 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [380]-388) and index.
327   $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tIntroduction -- $tChapter One: Escaping the Oscillation -- $tChapter Two: Regaining the World -- $tChapter Three: Perceptual Appearance and Perceptual World -- $tChapter Four: The View from Sideways-on, Common Factors and Other Loose Ends -- $tChapter Five: Two Senses of Nature? -- $tChapter Six: From Nature to World -- $tChapter Seven: On the Brink of Phenomenology -- $tConclusion: From McDowell to Husserl and Beyond -- $t Backmatter
330   $aThis book draws upon the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger in order to provide an alternative elaboration of John McDowell's thesis that in order to understand how self-conscious subjectivity relates to the world, perception must be understood as a genuine unity of spontaneity ('concept') and receptivity ('intuition'). This alternative elaboration permits clarification of McDowell's critique of Donald Davidson and development of an alternative conception of perceptual experience giving clear sense to McDowell's claim that self-conscious subjectivity is so inherently in touch with its world that scepticism about the latter must be incoherent. It also permits development of a more accurate, historically oriented critique of the metaphysics constraining one to construe perceptual experience in ways which misrepresent how self-conscious subjectivity bears upon the world. It shows that many of McDowell's meta-philosophical views are implicitly Husserlian and that had McDowell developed them further, he would have avoided the paradoxical meta-philosophy he adopts from Wittgenstein. In conclusion, it intimates the central weakness in Husserl's position which takes one from Husserl to Heidegger. The book is written in terms accessible to analytic philosophers and will thus enable them to see the central differences between analytic and phenomenological approaches to intentionality and self-consciousness. 
410  0$aQuellen und Studien zur Philosophie ;$vBd. 89.
606   $aAnalysis (Philosophy)
606   $aPhenomenology
610   $aAnalytic Philosophy.
610   $aDavidson.
610   $aHusserl.
610   $aIntentionality.
610   $aMcDowell.
610   $aPerception.
610   $aPhenomenology.
610   $aPhilosophy of Mind.
615  0$aAnalysis (Philosophy)
615  0$aPhenomenology.
676   $a142.7
700   $aChristensen$b Carleton B$01544955
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910782764303321
996   $aSelf and world$93799547
997   $aUNINA