LEADER 04103nam 2200745Ia 450 001 9910782764303321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-281-99962-8 010 $a9786611999629 010 $a3-11-021217-X 024 7 $a10.1515/9783110212174 035 $a(CKB)1000000000697981 035 $a(EBL)429292 035 $a(OCoLC)437113300 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000243696 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11200179 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000243696 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10164627 035 $a(PQKB)10513349 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC429292 035 $a(DE-B1597)35350 035 $a(OCoLC)979749423 035 $a(DE-B1597)9783110212174 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL429292 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10275888 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL199962 035 $a(PPN)159710405 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000697981 100 $a20090305d2008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aSelf and world$b[electronic resource] $efrom analytic philosophy to phenomenology /$fby Carleton B. Christensen 210 $aBerlin ;$aNew York $cWalter De Gruyter$dc2008 215 $a1 online resource (404 p.) 225 1 $aQuellen und Studien zur Philosophie,$x0344-8142 ;$vBd. 89 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-11-020401-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [380]-388) and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tIntroduction -- $tChapter One: Escaping the Oscillation -- $tChapter Two: Regaining the World -- $tChapter Three: Perceptual Appearance and Perceptual World -- $tChapter Four: The View from Sideways-on, Common Factors and Other Loose Ends -- $tChapter Five: Two Senses of Nature? -- $tChapter Six: From Nature to World -- $tChapter Seven: On the Brink of Phenomenology -- $tConclusion: From McDowell to Husserl and Beyond -- $t Backmatter 330 $aThis book draws upon the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger in order to provide an alternative elaboration of John McDowell's thesis that in order to understand how self-conscious subjectivity relates to the world, perception must be understood as a genuine unity of spontaneity ('concept') and receptivity ('intuition'). This alternative elaboration permits clarification of McDowell's critique of Donald Davidson and development of an alternative conception of perceptual experience giving clear sense to McDowell's claim that self-conscious subjectivity is so inherently in touch with its world that scepticism about the latter must be incoherent. It also permits development of a more accurate, historically oriented critique of the metaphysics constraining one to construe perceptual experience in ways which misrepresent how self-conscious subjectivity bears upon the world. It shows that many of McDowell's meta-philosophical views are implicitly Husserlian and that had McDowell developed them further, he would have avoided the paradoxical meta-philosophy he adopts from Wittgenstein. In conclusion, it intimates the central weakness in Husserl's position which takes one from Husserl to Heidegger. The book is written in terms accessible to analytic philosophers and will thus enable them to see the central differences between analytic and phenomenological approaches to intentionality and self-consciousness. 410 0$aQuellen und Studien zur Philosophie ;$vBd. 89. 606 $aAnalysis (Philosophy) 606 $aPhenomenology 610 $aAnalytic Philosophy. 610 $aDavidson. 610 $aHusserl. 610 $aIntentionality. 610 $aMcDowell. 610 $aPerception. 610 $aPhenomenology. 610 $aPhilosophy of Mind. 615 0$aAnalysis (Philosophy) 615 0$aPhenomenology. 676 $a142.7 700 $aChristensen$b Carleton B$01544955 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910782764303321 996 $aSelf and world$93799547 997 $aUNINA