LEADER 03401nam 2200673Ia 450 001 9910782730203321 005 20230912144322.0 010 $a1-282-85446-1 010 $a9786612854460 010 $a0-7735-6656-2 024 7 $a10.1515/9780773566569 035 $a(CKB)1000000000713446 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000279759 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11223286 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000279759 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10268454 035 $a(PQKB)10038538 035 $a(CaPaEBR)400824 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3331105 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10141776 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL285446 035 $a(OCoLC)929121262 035 $a(VaAlCD)20.500.12592/6bb3r4 035 $a(schport)gibson_crkn/2009-12-01/1/400824 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3331105 035 $a(DE-B1597)656908 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780773566569 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3245451 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000713446 100 $a19981029d1997 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe future's back$b[electronic resource] $enuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War /$fFrank P. Harvey 210 $aMontreal $cMcGill-Queen's University Press$dc1997 215 $axvi, 192 p. $cill. ;$d24 cm 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-7735-1606-9 311 $a0-7735-1605-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [171]-188) and index. 327 $tFront Matter -- $tContents -- $tTables and Figures -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIntroduction -- $tCumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions -- $tNuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing -- $tNew Directions for Aggregate Testing -- $tGame Theory and Superpower Rivalry: 1948?88 -- $tU.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence -- $tNuclear Stability after the Cold War -- $tConventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War -- $tNotes -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aArguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry. 606 $aDeterrence (Strategy) 606 $aNuclear warfare 606 $aWorld politics$y1989- 615 0$aDeterrence (Strategy) 615 0$aNuclear warfare. 615 0$aWorld politics 676 $a327.1/747 700 $aHarvey$b Frank P$0573670 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910782730203321 996 $aThe future's back$93680270 997 $aUNINA