LEADER 03688nam 22006972 450 001 9910781992403321 005 20151005020621.0 010 $a1-107-22727-5 010 $a1-139-09763-6 010 $a1-283-34189-1 010 $a1-139-10347-4 010 $a9786613341891 010 $a1-139-10101-3 010 $a1-139-10167-6 010 $a1-139-09898-5 010 $a0-511-79339-1 010 $a1-139-09967-1 035 $a(CKB)2550000000056319 035 $a(EBL)803129 035 $a(OCoLC)769342132 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000538824 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11369652 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000538824 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10560626 035 $a(PQKB)10835971 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511793394 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC803129 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL803129 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10502833 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL334189 035 $a(PPN)157867668 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000056319 100 $a20100628d2011|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aMaking constitutions in deeply divided societies /$fHanna Lerner$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2011. 215 $a1 online resource (ix, 262 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-61057-5 311 $a1-107-00515-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 235-257) and index. 327 $gIntroduction -- PART I :$tCONSTITUTIONS, DEMOCRACY, IDENTITY:$tThree paradigms of democratic constitutions --$tThe incrementalist approach to constitution-making --$gPART II :$tVARIETIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INCREMENTALISM:$tInformal consociationalism in Israel --$tConstructive ambiguity in India --$tSymbolic ambivalence in Ireland --$gPART III :$tARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL INCREMENTALISM:$tNormative arguments for constitutional incrementalism --$tPotential dangers --$gConclusion. 330 $aHow can societies still grappling over the common values and shared vision of their state draft a democratic constitution? This is the central puzzle of Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies. While most theories discuss constitution-making in the context of a moment of revolutionary change, Hanna Lerner argues that an incrementalist approach to constitution-making can enable societies riven by deep internal disagreements to either enact a written constitution or function with an unwritten one. She illustrates the process of constitution-writing in three deeply divided societies - Israel, India and Ireland - and explores the various incrementalist strategies deployed by their drafters. These include the avoidance of clear decisions, the use of ambivalent legal language and the inclusion of contrasting provisions in the constitution. Such techniques allow the deferral of controversial choices regarding the foundational aspects of the polity to future political institutions, thus enabling the constitution to reflect a divided identity. 606 $aConstitutional law$zIsrael 606 $aConstitutional law$zIndia 606 $aConstitutional law$zIreland 615 0$aConstitutional law 615 0$aConstitutional law 615 0$aConstitutional law 676 $a342.02 700 $aLerner$b Hanna$c(College teacher),$0516038 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910781992403321 996 $aMaking constitutions in deeply divided societies$9853639 997 $aUNINA