LEADER 04083nam 2200709 a 450 001 9910781713803321 005 20230725053514.0 010 $a1-283-27990-8 010 $a9786613279903 010 $a0-300-18022-5 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300180220 035 $a(CKB)2550000000054648 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH24486766 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000538690 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11339902 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000538690 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10559956 035 $a(PQKB)10086854 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3420723 035 $a(DE-B1597)486088 035 $a(OCoLC)769149043 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300180220 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3420723 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10497653 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL327990 035 $a(OCoLC)923596457 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000054648 100 $a20110330d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLosing small wars$b[electronic resource] $eBritish military failure in Iraq and Afghanstan /$fFrank Ledwidge 210 $aNew Haven $cYale University Press$dc2011 215 $a1 online resource (304 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-300-16671-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [270]-298) and index. 327 $tFrontmatter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgements --$tIntroduction --$tChapter 1: 'Ridiculous Expectations' --$tChapter 2: 'Defeated, Pure and Simple' --$tChapter 3: 'Where's Helmand?' --$tChapter 4: 'A Bleeding Ulcer' --$tChapter 5: Dereliction of Duty: The Generals and Strategy --$tChapter 6: Cracking On: British Military Culture and Doctrine --$tChapter 7: 'Tactics without Strategy?' The Counterinsurgency Conundrum --$tChapter 8: Doing No Harm? The Question of Force --$tChapter 9: Civvies --$tChapter 10: Bad Influences --$tChapter 11: Opening Networks --$tConclusion --$tAbbreviations and Acronyms --$tNotes --$tSelect Bibliography --$tIndex 330 $aPartly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as-at best-disappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army.In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest "small wars." This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs. 606 $aIraq War, 2003-2011$xParticipation, British 606 $aIraq War, 2003-2011$xCampaigns$zIraq$zBas?rah 606 $aAfghan War, 2001-2021$xParticipation, British 606 $aAfghan War, 2001-2021$xCampaigns$zAfghanistan$zHelmand River Valley 606 $aStrategic culture$zGreat Britain 607 $aGreat Britain$xArmed Forces$xManagement 607 $aGreat Britain$xMilitary policy 615 0$aIraq War, 2003-2011$xParticipation, British. 615 0$aIraq War, 2003-2011$xCampaigns 615 0$aAfghan War, 2001-2021$xParticipation, British. 615 0$aAfghan War, 2001-2021$xCampaigns 615 0$aStrategic culture 676 $a956.7044/3341 700 $aLedwidge$b Frank$01038295 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910781713803321 996 $aLosing small wars$92459801 997 $aUNINA