LEADER 04047nam 2200757 a 450 001 9910781566103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8014-6302-5 010 $a0-8014-6301-7 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801463013 035 $a(CKB)2550000000066248 035 $a(OCoLC)1162426128 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10514896 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000564869 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11361521 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000564869 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10516555 035 $a(PQKB)10871477 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001499059 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138271 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse28877 035 $a(DE-B1597)478602 035 $a(OCoLC)979744035 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801463013 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138271 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10514896 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL769576 035 $a(OCoLC)774285567 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000066248 100 $a20110315d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe logic of positive engagement$b[electronic resource] /$fMiroslav Nincic 210 $aIthaca [N.Y.] $cCornell University Press$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (221 p.) 225 1 $aCornell studies in security affairs 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-8014-5006-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aThe failures of external coercion -- A parallel bias -- A framework for analysis -- Foundations of success and failure : Libya, Cuba, and Syria -- The challenge of North Korea and Iran -- Final thoughts. 330 $aRecent American foreign policy has depended heavily on the use of negative inducements to alter the behavior of other states. From public browbeating through economic sanctions to military invasion, the last several presidents have chosen to use coercion to advance U.S. interests when dealing with adversaries. In this respect, as Miroslav Nincic notes, the United States differs from many of its closest allies: Canada has long maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba, and several of the European democracies have continued diplomatic engagement with governments that the United States considers pariah regimes. In The Logic of Positive Engagement, Nincic outlines the efficacy of and the benefits that can flow from positive rather than negative engagement.Nincic observes that threats and punishments may be gratifying in a symbolic sense, but that they haven't affected the longevity or the most objectionable policies of the regimes against which they are directed. Might positive inducements produce better results? Nincic examines two major models of positive inducements: the exchange model, in which incentives are offered in trade for altered behavior, and the catalytic model, in which incentives accumulate to provoke a thorough revision of the target's policies and priorities. He examines the record with regard to long-term U.S. relations with Cuba, Libya, and Syria, and then discusses the possibility that positive inducements might bring policy success to current relations with Iran and North Korea. 410 0$aCornell studies in security affairs. 606 $aEconomic assistance, American 606 $aEconomic sanctions, American 606 $aInternational relations 606 $aDiplomacy 606 $aSecurity, International 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1945-1989 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1989- 615 0$aEconomic assistance, American. 615 0$aEconomic sanctions, American. 615 0$aInternational relations. 615 0$aDiplomacy. 615 0$aSecurity, International. 676 $a327.73 700 $aNincic$b Miroslav$0613821 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910781566103321 996 $aThe logic of positive engagement$93719681 997 $aUNINA