LEADER 04145nam 2200673 a 450 001 9910781566003321 005 20230523175152.0 010 $a1-4008-2330-7 010 $a9786613339713 010 $a1-4008-1172-4 010 $a1-283-33971-4 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400823307 035 $a(CKB)2550000000066252 035 $a(EBL)804865 035 $a(OCoLC)763158156 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000224555 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11186144 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000224555 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10210793 035 $a(PQKB)11055638 035 $a(OCoLC)51628612 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36302 035 $a(DE-B1597)447844 035 $a(OCoLC)979905081 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400823307 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL804865 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10514787 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL333971 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC804865 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000066252 100 $a19981123d1999 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe populist paradox $einterest group influence and the promise of direct legislation /$fElisabeth R. Gerber 205 $aCore Textbook 210 1$aPrinceton, N.J. :$cPrinceton University Press,$d1999. 215 $a1 online resource (186 pages) $cillustrations 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-691-00266-5 311 0 $a0-691-00267-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter --$tContents --$tFigures --$tTables --$tAcknowledgments --$t1. What Is the Populist Paradox? --$t2. Interest Group Choice --$t3. Direct Legislation Hurdles --$t4. Group Characteristics and Resources --$t5. Motivations and Strategies --$t6. Motivations and Strategies --$t7. Indirect Policy Consequences --$t8. The Populist Paradox: Reality or Illusion? --$tAppendix A. Direct Legislation Institutions --$tAppendix B. Survey of Organizations --$tReferences --$tIndex 330 $aDo small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence. Gerber bases her findings on extensive surveys of the activities and motivations of interest groups and on close examination of campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in eight states. Her research confirms what such wealthy interests as the insurance industry, trial lawyer associations, and tobacco companies have learned by defeats at the ballot box: if citizens do not like a proposed new law, even an expensive, high-profile campaign will not make them change their mind. She demonstrates, however, that these economic interest groups have considerable success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and organized interests in the American legislative process. 606 $aReferendum$zUnited States 606 $aPressure groups$zUnited States 615 0$aReferendum 615 0$aPressure groups 676 $a324/.4/0973 700 $aGerber$b Elisabeth R.$f1964-$01034825 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910781566003321 996 $aThe populist paradox$93719680 997 $aUNINA