LEADER 04116nam 2200793Ia 450 001 9910780817603321 005 20230120084539.0 010 $a0-691-13074-4 010 $a9786612457944 010 $a1-282-45794-2 010 $a1-282-93600-X 010 $a9786612936005 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400833092 035 $a(CKB)2550000000000986 035 $a(EBL)483529 035 $a(OCoLC)697174358 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000365009 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11263056 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000365009 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10402606 035 $a(PQKB)10029963 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000572073 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12250944 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000572073 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10527493 035 $a(PQKB)11451296 035 $a(DE-B1597)446598 035 $a(OCoLC)979881693 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400833092 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL483529 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10364785 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL293600 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4968540 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL245794 035 $a(OCoLC)536418922 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC483529 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4968540 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000000986 100 $a20090214d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aRational decisions$b[electronic resource] /$fKen Binmore 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc2009 215 $a1 online resource (214 p.) 225 1 $aThe Gorman lectures in economics 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-14989-5 311 $a1-4008-3309-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $t1. Revealed Preference -- $t2. Game Theory -- $t3. Risk -- $t4. Utilitarianism -- $t5. Classical Probability -- $t6. Frequency -- $t7. Bayesian Decision Theory -- $t8. Epistemology -- $t9. Large Worlds -- $t10. Mathematical Notes -- $tReferences -- $tIndex -- $t Backmatter 330 $aIt is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian decision theory--and when does it need to be modified? Using a minimum of mathematics, Rational Decisions clearly explains the foundations of Bayesian decision theory and shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds. The book is a wide-ranging exploration of standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty. Ken Binmore discusses the various philosophical attitudes related to the nature of probability and offers resolutions to paradoxes believed to hinder further progress. In arguing that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world, Binmore proposes an extension to Bayesian decision theory--allowing the idea of a mixed strategy in game theory to be expanded to a larger set of what Binmore refers to as "muddled" strategies. Written by one of the world's leading game theorists, Rational Decisions is the touchstone for anyone needing a concise, accessible, and expert view on Bayesian decision making. 410 0$aGorman lectures in economics. 606 $aBayesian statistical decision theory 606 $aStatistical decision 615 0$aBayesian statistical decision theory. 615 0$aStatistical decision. 676 $a519.542 700 $aBinmore$b K. G.$f1940-$0116988 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910780817603321 996 $aRational decisions$9804645 997 $aUNINA