LEADER 04376nam 2200733Ia 450 001 9910780803703321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-45859-0 010 $a9786612458590 010 $a1-4008-3198-9 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400831982 035 $a(CKB)2550000000000339 035 $a(EBL)483591 035 $a(OCoLC)593215217 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000335169 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11273989 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000335169 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10273591 035 $a(PQKB)11562403 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36653 035 $a(DE-B1597)446650 035 $a(OCoLC)979579138 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400831982 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL483591 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10364747 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL245859 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC483591 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000000339 100 $a20090512d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|||||||nn|n 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBeyond the formalist-realist divide$b[electronic resource] $ethe role of politics in judging /$fBrian Z. Tamanaha 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, NJ $cPrinceton University Press$dc2010 215 $a1 online resource (265 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-14279-3 311 $a0-691-14280-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$t1. Introduction --$tPart One. The Legal Formalists --$t2. The Myth about Beliefs in the Common Law --$t3. The Myth about "Mechanical Jurisprudence" --$t4. The Holes in the Story about Legal Formalism --$tPart Two. The Legal Realists --$t5. Realism before the Legal Realists --$t6. A Reconstruction of Legal Realism --$tPart Three. Studies of Judging --$t7. The Slant in the "Judicial Politics" Field --$t8. What Quantitative Studies of Judging Have Found --$tPart Four. Legal Theory --$t9. The Emptiness of "Formalism" in Legal Theory --$t10. Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide --$tAfterword --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aAccording to conventional wisdom in American legal culture, the 1870's to 1920's was the age of legal formalism, when judges believed that the law was autonomous and logically ordered, and that they mechanically deduced right answers in cases. In the 1920's and 1930's, the story continues, the legal realists discredited this view by demonstrating that the law is marked by gaps and contradictions, arguing that judges construct legal justifications to support desired outcomes. This often-repeated historical account is virtually taken for granted today, and continues to shape understandings about judging. In this groundbreaking book, esteemed legal theorist Brian Tamanaha thoroughly debunks the formalist-realist divide. Drawing from extensive research into the writings of judges and scholars, Tamanaha shows how, over the past century and a half, jurists have regularly expressed a balanced view of judging that acknowledges the limitations of law and of judges, yet recognizes that judges can and do render rule-bound decisions. He reveals how the story about the formalist age was an invention of politically motivated critics of the courts, and how it has led to significant misunderstandings about legal realism. Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide traces how this false tale has distorted studies of judging by political scientists and debates among legal theorists. Recovering a balanced realism about judging, this book fundamentally rewrites legal history and offers a fresh perspective for theorists, judges, and practitioners of law. 606 $aJudges$zUnited States 606 $aJudicial process$zUnited States 606 $aLaw$xPolitical aspects$zUnited States 606 $aLaw$zUnited States$xPhilosophy 610 $aLegal formalism. 610 $aLegal realism. 615 0$aJudges 615 0$aJudicial process 615 0$aLaw$xPolitical aspects 615 0$aLaw$xPhilosophy. 676 $a347.73/14 686 $aMG 70800$2rvk 700 $aTamanaha$b Brian Z$0256838 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910780803703321 996 $aBeyond the formalist-realist divide$93701218 997 $aUNINA