LEADER 04569nam 22006972 450 001 9910780292003321 005 20151005020620.0 010 $a1-107-12582-0 010 $a0-521-03918-5 010 $a0-511-14776-7 010 $a0-511-04556-5 010 $a0-511-49879-9 010 $a1-280-43408-2 010 $a0-511-17743-7 010 $a0-511-30501-X 035 $a(CKB)111082128285928 035 $a(EBL)202203 035 $a(OCoLC)191035534 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000136828 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11158686 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000136828 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10087660 035 $a(PQKB)10323072 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511498794 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC202203 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL202203 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10021396 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL43408 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111082128285928 100 $a20090309d2002|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aDeontic morality and control /$fIshtiyaque Haji$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2002. 215 $a1 online resource (xiv, 288 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aCambridge studies in philosophy 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a0-521-81387-5 311 $a0-511-02056-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 272-281) and index. 327 $tTwo Parallel Riddles --$tPrimary Goals --$tProspectus --$tDeterminism and Deontic Morality --$tObligation and Control --$tFundamentals of Moral Obligation --$t'Can' and Obligation --$tFrankfurt-Type Cases and Deontic Control --$tFrankfurt-Type Examples --$tA Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Wrong Actions --$tPrinciple CK and Wrongness --$tThe Plausibility of Principles CK and WC --$tA Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Deontic Morality --$tAn Alternative Argument --$tControl Requirements of Deontic Anchors: Some Objections --$tObjections to K and Replies --$tFrankfurt-Type Cases and K --$tA Widerkerian Objection against K --$tAn Objection from Counterintuitiveness --$tFischer against K --$tA Direct Threat against K from Frankfurt-Type Examples --$tSelf-Imposed Impossibility and K --$tPereboom on OW --$tGenuine Moral Dilemmas and OW --$tYaffe on K --$tDeterminism and Deontic Anchors --$tThe Consequence Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Alternative Possibilities --$tSome Objections and Replies --$tWhy Determinism Undermines Deontic Anchors --$tObjections to the New Incompatibility Thesis and Replies --$tSaka on 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Determinism --$tIndeterminism and Deontic Morality --$tTransition: From Determinism to Indeterminism --$tSynopsis --$tR-Libertarianism --$tModest Meleian Libertarianism --$tAn Objection and a Reply --$tModest Meleian Libertarianism and Deontic Anchors --$tRobust Modest R-Libertarianism and Luck --$tRobust Modest R-Libertarianism --$tRobust R-Libertarianism and the Luck Objection. 330 $aThis book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified. 410 0$aCambridge studies in philosophy. 517 3 $aDeontic Morality & Control 606 $aFree will and determinism 606 $aEthics 606 $aDuty 615 0$aFree will and determinism. 615 0$aEthics. 615 0$aDuty. 676 $a123/.5 700 $aHaji$b Ishtiyaque$01523476 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910780292003321 996 $aDeontic morality and control$93821100 997 $aUNINA