LEADER 03621oam 22006492 450 001 9910780286603321 005 20231016233231.0 010 $a1-107-12447-6 010 $a0-521-03407-8 010 $a0-511-04441-0 010 $a0-511-49878-0 010 $a0-511-15464-X 010 $a1-280-41926-1 010 $a0-511-17467-5 010 $a0-511-30370-X 035 $a(CKB)111082128284840 035 $a(EBL)202235 035 $a(OCoLC)437063467 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000225952 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11198409 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000225952 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10233803 035 $a(PQKB)11223915 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511498787 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC202235 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL202235 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10069916 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL41926 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111082128284840 100 $a20090309d2001|||| uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aPractical rules $ewhen we need them and when we don't /$fAlan H. Goldman 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2001. 215 $a1 online resource (xi, 210 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aCambridge studies in philosophy 311 0 $a0-521-80729-8 311 0 $a0-511-01844-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 197-201) and index. 327 $a1. Moral Rules -- I. Outline of the Task -- II. Types of Rules: Dispensable and Indispensable -- III. Ordinary Moral Consciousness -- IV. Rules as Second-Best Strategies -- V. The Justification of Rules: Strong and Weak -- VI. Interpretation of Weak Rules -- 2. Prudential Rules -- I. Moral and Prudential Rules Compared -- II. Second-Order Prudential Rules: Optimizing -- III. A Prudential Rule to Be Moral -- 3. Legal Rules -- I. Classification -- II. The Descriptive Question: Hart, Dworkin, and Others -- III. The Descriptive Question: Sources of Law -- IV. The Normative Question -- 4. Moral Reasoning without Rules -- I. The Inadequacy of Particularism -- II. Coherence -- III. The Reasoning Process Reviewed -- IV. Objections. 330 $aRules proliferate; some are kept with a bureaucratic stringency bordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular circumstances? The two dominant models in the literature on rules are the particularist account and that which sees the application of rules as normative. Taking a position that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman provides a systematic framework to clarify when we need to follow rules in our moral, legal and prudential decisions, and when we ought not to do so. The book distinguishes among various types of rules; it illuminates concepts such as integrity, self-interest and self-deception; and finally, it provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules. This book will be of great interest to advanced students and professionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory and the social sciences. 410 0$aCambridge studies in philosophy. 606 $aEthics 606 $aRules (Philosophy) 615 0$aEthics. 615 0$aRules (Philosophy) 676 $a170/.42 700 $aGoldman$b Alan H.$f1945-$01554761 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910780286603321 996 $aPractical rules$93816244 997 $aUNINA